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ABSTRACT
The relevance of agricultural credit is augmented in the 
context of the increasing emphasis on rural development and mitigation 
of poverty. This study aims to examine certain important facets 
connected with agricultural credit in India. It is a macro analysis 
at the National and State levels. Data from Reserve Bank of India's 
surveys for 1951-52, 1961-62 and 1971-72 have been primarily used.
Despite the plethora of credit institutions established in 
recent years, the bulk of agricultural credit still comes from non-formal 
sources. Examination of credit disbursement in different States by 
institutional agencies suggests their competitiveness rather than 
complementarity and indicates a widening of the existing inter-regional 
disparities. Better institutional credit arrangements and a high level 
of literacy, satisfactory performance in implementation of land reforms, 
use of irrigation particularly well irrigation, use of chemical fertilizers, 
progress in rural electrification and development of marketing facilities 
are significantly correlated.
The analysis shows that credit inadequacy is quantitative as 
well as qualitative. However, contrary to the widely held view, the 
quantitative shortfall cannot be explained by low interest rates in the 
agricultural sector. Qualitatively, accessibility of credit to small 
farmers continues to be impeded, although its importance is recognised. 
Arguments, such as high default rates, generally advanced to explain 
insufficient small farmer credit, do not stand the test of close scrutiny. 
The view that interest rates be raised to expand small farmer credit has 
little merit and in fact analysis indicates that
vii
there is scope for adopting differential rates of interest in 
favour of small farmers.
The policy prescriptions suggested include a revamping of 
management of credit institutions to increase credit supply in the 
agricultural sector. It is recommended that a separate credit channel 
exclusively for small farmers be established. This should function in 
close association with Small Farmers' Development Agencies so that the
benefits of effective supervised credit become available to small farmers.
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CHAPTER 1
WHY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
1.1 Agriculture and Development
Development as a concept has undergone a metamorphosis in 
the last decade. The earlier preoccupation with aggregates like per 
capita income or gross national product has yielded to an increasing 
emphasis on the qualitative aspects, and particularly on the welfare of 
the rural poor. This concern is reflected in the definitions of rural 
development adopted by international agencies in recent times. The 
World Bank defined it as "a strategy designed to improve the economic 
and social life of a specific group of people, the rural poor". [77]
The International Labour Organisation [78] stresses the basic needs 
aspects which consists of minimum requirements (food, shelter, clothing 
etc.) and essential services (drinking water, health, education etc.).
This shift in emphasis has been accelerated by the realisation 
that past development policies, which essentially reflected the bimodal 
or "trickle down" theory of development, failed to make a discernible 
impression on the problem of rural poverty as any benefits were cornered 
by the better off segments of rural society. In part it is due to an 
appreciation by development economists of the fact that 80% of the 
world's poor live in the rural areas, whereas developmental efforts have 
had a distinct urban bias thereby accentuating the urban-rural dichotomy. 
This has led to an increased awareness that models of growth based entirely 
on a rapid expansion of the industrial sector are self-defeating, and 
unless measures to increase the effective demand of the rural sector 
are undertaken, the process of industrialisation is likely to grind to a 
halt. This was brought home rather strikingly in India in the mid 1960s 
which witnessed the paradox of inflation being accompanied by industrial
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r e c e s s i o n .  The a n t i t h e t i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  d e v e lo p m e n ta l  s t r a t e g i e s  h a s  
been  s u c c i n c t l y  b r o u g h t  o u t  i n  I n d i a  i n  t h e  1970s when d e s p i t e  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  l e v e l  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  g row th  m easu red  in  te rm s  o f  
a g g r e g a t e s ,  and a b u f f e r  s to c k  o f  o v e r  20 m i l l i o n  to n s  o f  f o o d g r a in s  in  
Government w a re h o u se s ,  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  r u r a l  p r o v e r t y  h a s  been  
e x a c e r b a t e d  w h i le  a t  t h e  same t im e  i n d u s t r i a l  grow th h a s  been  b e d e v i l e d  
by i n s u f f i c i e n t  e f f e c t i v e  demand. T h is  w eakness  h as  o n ly  b e l a t e d l y  been  
r e c o g n i s e d  in  t h e  l a t e s t  F iv e  Year P la n  [1 ] .
P o v e r ty  i n  I n d i a  has  been  q u a n t i f i e d  by Dandekar and Ruth [2] 
and  C la rk  [ 3 ] .  A c c o rd in g  t o  b o th  e s t i m a t e s ,  be tw een  24 t o  40% o f  t h e  
r u r a l  p o o r  l i v e  i n  h u n g e r .  Minhas [4] a p p ro a c h in g  th e  p ro b lem  from th e  
p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  a b a s i c  minimum income n e c e s s a r y  t o  s u s t a i n  e x i s t e n c e ,  
found t h a t  be tw een  40 t o  50% o f  t h e  r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  l i v e s  below  th e  
p o v e r ty  l i n e .
1 .2  Im p o r ta n c e  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  i n  I n d i a
The above a n a l y s i s  i s  a p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e
r u r a l  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  economy. W ith in  t h e  r u r a l  s e c t o r ,  th e  
p rom inence  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  can  be gauged  by th e  f o l l o w in g  i n d i c e s .
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TABLE 1.1
CLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS, 1961 and 1971 - ALL INDIA
Class of 1961 1971
Workers Total Workers 
(millions)
Percentage 
to total
Total Workers Percentage 
(millions) to total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cultivators 99.6 52.8 78.3 43.4
Agricultural labourers 31.5 16.7 47.5 26.3
Other Workers 57.6 30.5 54.7 30.3
TOTAL Workers 188.7 100.0 180.5 100.0
Source: Census of India 1971'*’
Table 1.1 shows that around 70% of the work force was engaged in the
agricultural sector in both 1961 and 1971.
TABLE 1.2
AGRICULTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL INCOME AT 1960-61 PRICES
1961 1971
National Income (Rs in crore) 13263 19033
National Income from Agriculture 6580 8137
Income from Agriculture as a % of 
total National Income
49.6 42.8
Source: Indian Agriculture in brief. (20)
Table 1.2 shows that despite a decline in the contribution of agriculture
1 The fact that the total number of workers declined from 188.7 millions 
in 1961 to 180.5 million is due to a change in the definition of workers 
in the two Censuses.
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i n  N a t io n a l  Income o v e r  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  i t  a c c o u n te d  f o r  n e a r l y  43% o f  th e  
t o t a l  N a t io n a l  Income i n  1971. A g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  a round  
40% o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  w hich  h i g h l i g h t s  a  f u r t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
a g r i c u l t u r e  in  t h e  I n d ia n  economy (T ab le  1 .3 )  w h i le  im p o r ts  (m o s t ly  
u n d e r  PL 480) were s l i g h t l y  l e s s  a t  a b o u t  33%. I t  s h o u ld  be m a n i f e s t l y  
e v i d e n t  from T a b le s  1 . 1 ,  1 .2  and 1 .3  t h a t  d e ve lopm en t programmes w hich 
i m p l i c i t l y  o r  e x p l i c i t l y  ig n o re  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  
in  t h e  economy w i l l  s u c c e e d  o n ly  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  th e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  r u r a l  
p o v e r t y .
TABLE 1 .3
SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
Year % s h a r e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  t o t a l  e x p o r t s
% s h a r e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  
i n  t o t a l  im p o r ts
1970-71 37 .1 37 .2
1971-72 37 .4 3 1 .8
1972-73 38 .3 2 5 .9
1973-74 4 0 .3 31 .1
1974-75 4 2 .3 34 .0
S o u rce :  I n d ia n  A g r i c u l t u r e  i n  B r i e f .  (20)
A s tu d y  [79] o f  74 d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  u s in g  s t e p - w i s e  
r e g r e s s i o n  and d i s c r i m i n a n t  a n a l y s i s  f o r  th e  p e r i o d  1957-62 c o n c lu d e d  
t h a t  t h e  d e g re e  o f  im provem ent i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  an 
i m p o r ta n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  d i s c r i m i n a n t  f u n c t i o n  a c c o u n t in g  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l s  o f  growth o f  p e r  c a p i t a  Gross N a t io n a l  P r o d u c t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
c o u n t r i e s .  But does  an i n c r e a s e  in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  im p ly  a 
p a r i  p a s s u  improvement in  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  r u r a l  p o v e r ty ?  A r e c e n t  
a n a l y s i s  w hich a t t e m p te d  t o  examine t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  r u r a l
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poverty and agricultural performance in India between the period 1956-7 
to 1973-4, found that the "all-India evidence is entirely consistent 
with the hypothesis that the incidence of rural poverty is inversely 
related to agricultural performance measured in terms of agricultural 
NDP (Net Domestic Product) per rural person" [80].
Despite the comparative significance of the agricultural 
sector, Indian agriculture is characterised by low yields (Table 1.4). 
Since these data relate to the entire economy, they conceal wide 
inter-regional variations. For instance, rice and wheat yields in 
Punjab were over 2000 kgs/hectare and the consumption of inorganic 
fertilisers in 1974-5 in Punjab was 47.3 kgs/hectare, i.e. more than 
three times the national average [20]. Nevertheless, the international 
figures in Table 1.4 serve to underscore the point that Indian 
agriculture is comparatively backward.
TABLE 1.4
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF INDIAN AGRICULTURE
Countries Yields Rice (1974)
in kilograms/hectare 
Wheat (1974) Maize
Fertiliser consump- 
(1974) tion in kilograms/ 
hectare (1972-73).
N P2°5 k2° Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
India 1592 1172 967 10 3 2 15
Japan 5838 - - 117 115 96 328
U.S.A. 4978 1842 4478 40 24 21 85
Sources: Cols. (2), (3), (4) - FAO Production Yearbook
Cols. (5) , (6) , (7), (8) - Indian Agriculture in Brief. (20)
A number of reasons have been adduced to explain the backward­
ness of Indian agriculture. Those often cited as being responsible include
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the failure of land reforms, inappropriate price policy and inadequate
education. It is true that land reforms in terms of a modest ceiling
on land ownership would permit transfer of productive assets to smaller
farmers and also might increase agricultural production since farm
management studies point to a higher productivity of smaller farms.
This approach however ascribes remedial properties to land reforms
which it does not possess. Even if all the available surplus land
were distributed to the rural poor, their average holding would be less
than 0.60 acres per capita [4]. This by itself is not likely to have a
tangible impact on the problem of rural poverty. Other critics
including Lipton [5] place the blame on foodgrain prices, contending
that their depression is detrimental to the rural sector. Whether
price policy is in fact an effective instrument for influencing total
agricultural output is debated [6]. It is certainly a questionable
prescription for India, a country where the bulk of the rural population
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are net purchasers of grain. These higher foodgrain prices will at best 
benefit the larger farmers with substantial marketable surplus.
The low level of formal education is also proposed as the main
impediment to rural progress [7]. According to this view agricultural
production in India can be doubled merely by improving formal education
to the levels in Japan. However, the high dropout rate of over 60% in
primary education in India and the fact that around 60% of the secondary
schools have less than 160 students would provide evidence to challenge
the view that the supply of education has been a constricting factor.
1.3 Relevance of Agricultural Credit
In the context of these divergent views and theories, what 
is the role of agricultural credit? Agricultural production involves 
the process of biological growth under infinitely varying conditions.
2 Over 60% of farmers are small holding less than 5 acres each. Studies
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Differences in soil, available plant nutrients and soil-water relation­
ships and their interaction with crop varieties of differing genetic 
potential and susceptibility to pests and diseases all contribute to a 
complexity of the process. What role does credit pay in this? It is 
held that in a situation characterised by stagnant technology, farmers 
over time will acquire the appropriate amount of capital so that 
credit, especially production credit, will not generally be an important 
constraining variable except in periods of unexpected crisis [8]. This 
lends credence to the point of view rejecting the importance of 
accessibility of credit of peasant farmers before they are "able to 
put even one foot on the ladder to increased productivity and increased 
income" [9]. Some others, [81, 82] on the other hand, have given due 
prominence to the role of capital in development.
In India, the introduction of the High Yielding Varieties in 
the mid 1960s for a number of important crops has appreciably altered 
existing input-output co-efficients. There was a major increase in 
the proportions of purchased inputs to total inputs, associated with 
the responsiveness of new crop varieties to chemical fertilisers under 
conditions of effective management of water, pests and diseases. These 
changes gave a fresh impetus to the role of credit. While the success 
of this new agricultural technology rests on the optimal allocation of 
these various inputs, for most farmers the capacity to make the 
appropriate choices with purchased inputs has hinged on the financial 
question of access to credit. Unfortunately the criticism that 
development has been discussed primarily in terms of rural "goods" to 
the exclusion of financial aspects [10] is as valid today as it was 
twenty five years ago.
(91, 92) show that the proportion of output marketed is directly related
to holdings size and is less than 50% for small farmers.
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Credit is a powerful economic tool as it facilitates a 
borrower's shift to a higher production possibility curve with a greater 
command over resources. Capital with scientific knowledge has in fact 
been described as the key combination for growth in Indian agriculture 
[15] and not land or labour, since the frontiers of land have more or 
less been reached and labour is an abundant resource whose marginal 
product, in the absence of capital to raise it, is near zero. A policy 
of allocation and distribution of capital is therefore an important means 
towards achieving developmental objectives. It should however be 
emphasised that mere availability of credit will not persuade farmers 
to adopt a particular technology [11]. Farm credit is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for agricultural development [8].
It is possible to distinguish between two basic elements in 
the decision making process regarding adoption of innovations. The 
first element is the decision or willingness to adopt and the second is 
the ability to adopt. Prima facie, the decision to adopt is a function 
of the farmer's assessment of the profitability of an enterprise and his 
subjective evaluation of the associated risks. The ability to adopt will 
depend on a wide range of factors like credit availability, irrigation, 
facilities etc. necessary for the enterprise and which indeed also 
serve to reduce the risks of adoption and hence have a bearing on the 
decision to adopt.
In a country like India, where the bulk of the farmers 
cultivate less than 5 acres, credit availability is a major factor 
influencing the rate of adoption of the new technology as the costs 
of cultivation associated with it are high and are generally beyond the 
capacity of most farmers to meet from their own resources. Credit 
available at reasonable rates, at the correct time and in adequate
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quantities not only affects the farmers' ability to adopt in a 
favourable way, but has an important influence on his decision to 
adopt, especially in the case of small farmers. If the farmer 
borrows from institutional sources (e.g. co-operatives) and if his 
crop was to fail, he knows he can obtain the necessary consumption 
credit from non-formal sources to provide him with his requirements 
till the next crop. But if institutional credit is not available, and 
if he had to obtain production finance from non-formal sources, not only 
would it reduce the profitability of the proposed venture (owing to 
the higher interest rates involved) but in the event of crop failure, 
his channels for obtaining consumption credit would be restricted.
To this extent, therefore, institutional credit acts as a cushion 
against risks enabling the farmer to transfer a part of the risk on to 
the credit institution.
A number of empirical studies have vouchsafed the importance 
of credit in raising agricultural production and productivity through 
adoption of better methods. Lowdermilk's [12] study of diffusion of 
dwarf wheat varieties in Pakistan's Punjab shows that credit availability 
is significantly related to the level of use of nitrogenous fertiliser 
for the new wheat varieties. Schlüter [13] found a relationship between 
the use of co-op. credit and adoption of new varieties in India but was 
not definite about the line of causality between the use of co-op. credit 
and adoption. Another study of Haryana State in India shows that credit 
is a crucial variable for adoption of new farm technology [14].
But has institutional credit been adequate for modernising 
Indian agriculture? Desai and Desai's study [83] of a district in 
Gujrat indicated the unusual finding that the existing availability of
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credit plus fanners own funds are sufficient to enable them to adopt new 
technology. They were of the view that the larger farmers obtained 
more institutional credit than their requirement which left considerable 
scope for the re-allocation of credit to other farmers. However, 
another study conducted jointly by the Australian National University 
and the Planning Commission of India, which covered the High Yielding 
Varieties Programme in India for the period 1970-75, while noting that 
the expansion of credit facilities had a bearing on the performance of 
the Programme, concluded that "in very few areas the cultivators were 
able to secure adequate credit for their purposes from institutional 
sources"[84]. This limitation applied particularly to small and 
marginal farmers.
We have alluded to the fact that credit is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for agricultural development. In fact in 
a limited sense, policies of input subsidisation or output price support 
can be considered to be alternatives to agricultural credit. Input 
subsidies will result in a lowering of the cost of cultivation, and 
thereby reduce the requirement for credit. Output price support will 
enable farmers to obtain a higher income from the same level of 
production and will increase their capacity for self-finance and hence 
lower their requirement for credit. Given the existence of profitable 
technology and the dissemination of the benefits of this technology to 
the farmers, credit acts as a catalytic agent in the process of 
agricultural development, provided certain other conditions are met. 
These other conditions include
(a) adequate and timely supplies of requisites, e.g. seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides,
(b) market access,
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(c) existence of a satisfactory land tenure system.
Existence of a profitable technology as well as availability
of credit would become redundant if suitable arrangements for the
supply of inputs are not made. Lack of a market for the produce will
likewise encumber the use of credit for adoption of new technology.
Finally, a land tenure system characterised by insecurity for tenants or
unfavourable sharecropping conditions may inhibit farmers from adopting
yield increasing technology while on the other hand the absentee landlord
may be disinclined to invest capital if arrangements are such that it
benefits only the tenant.
1.4 Objectives of the Study
Thus although it is true that credit is not Alladin's lamp 
requiring only rubbing to release the forces of agricultural development, 
it is equally true that no meaningful discussion of development, 
especially agricultural development, is complete without taking cognisance 
of credit. Keeping this in view, the objectives of this study are 
(1) to investigate both quantitatively and qualitatively the demand and 
supply aspects of agricultural credit in India, (2) to analyse the 
performance of institutions purveying agricultural credit (a) in absolute 
terms, (b) in terms of inter-state variations and (c) in terms of 
delivery of credit to small farmers and lastly (3) to examine factors 
which influence the price of credit.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
2.1 Demand and Requirement
Conceptually, the demand for agricultural credit is a 
derived demand - derived from the demand for investment on the one 
hand and the demand for consumption on the other. Investment credit 
itself can be split up into (a) current expenditure on the farm, 
e.g. seeds, fertilisers etc. and (b) capital expenditure on the farm, 
e.g. establishment of irrigation facilities, on farm development works, 
etc. The demand for investment credit itself is a function of the cost 
of credit and the marginal efficiency of capital which in turn is 
dependent on the profitability of technology, the awareness of the 
farmers and their degree of risk aversion.
If production is primarily for home consumption i.e. in an 
economy where subsistence agriculture is preponderant, the significance 
of market risk will be greatly diminished as farmers will be free from 
market influences. If subsistence agriculture is coupled with static 
technology, the relevance of risk would be further diminished, as 
farmers’ expectations regarding the movement of key variables would be 
a fairly accurate vision of reality, the speculations having been 
sharpened by historical experience over the years. This is, of course, 
not to imply the total exclusion of the risk factor. Even if farmers 
are fully aware of the magnitude of the ex-post returns from a 
particular set of inputs and in addition, it is assumed that they treat 
these ex-post returns as the best estimates of the ex-ante returns, it 
would still be difficult to predict their responses, without taking 
cognizance of their subjective attitudes to risk.
Capital and current expenditure on the farm are themselves
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inter-related. An increase in the demand for capital expenditure 
would usually lead to an expectation of an accompanying rise in the 
demand for current outlays on the farm and vice versa, since it 
enables higher production possibilities, so that the two components 
of investment credit would tend to move in the same direction and 
reinforce each other.
The demand for consumption credit too is a complex phenomenon. 
It depends partly on economic forces such as farm input-output 
relationships and partly on sociological factors such as social customs 
which dictate consumptions habits. Given the consumption habits, the 
lower the input:output ratio, (which itself is a function of the invest­
ment on the farm) the greater will be farmers savings, and so the less 
the demand for consumption credit. In view of the inter-relationships, 
outlined above, it is difficult to construct a demand schedule for 
credit because it is a composite demand.
The requirement of agricultural production credit can 
however, be postulated by a simple relationship as follows:
where Q represents requirements for production credit
Ip represents value of all production inputs
Ip represents value of inputs obtained on the farm
S represents savings of the farm enterprise.F
Traditional agriculture is characterised by low levels of output due 
to low productivity of traditional inputs with the bulk of inputs being 
obtained on the farm. Thus I may be expected to be low, 1^ to be high 
(but it cannot be higher than I ) and to be low or even negative 
reflecting low income levels and high demands of consumption on 
available income which in turn mirrors social customs e.g. lavish
14.
weddings, expensive funerals etc.
Assuming given production functions, Ip and I will be
given (being determined by the techniques of production) so that
Q = f(S ). But S itself is a function of consumption expenditure (C )F F E
so that Q = f(C ). Therefore to discuss agricultural production credit E
in isolation and ignore the requirements of consumption credit is to 
misrepresent the rural scene. If the assumption of given production 
functions is dropped and the introduction of new technology is taken 
into account, 1^ is likely to rise and 1^ to decline as the proportion 
of purchased inputs to total inputs will tend to increase.^ But 
since new profitable technology brings with it a higher output, the 
movement of S will depend on the inter-temporal consumption profile 
the farmers which in turn depends on the marginal propensity to consume.
If remains constant, Q will increase, if increases due to higher 
productivity not accompanied by a proportional increase in consumption 
expenditure, it will exert a downward pull on Q. If, on the other 
hand, S declines owing perhaps to higher consumption possibilities 
brought about by higher incomes, it will tend to reinforce the upward 
movement of Q due to changes in I and I . Thus although no a priori 
conclusion can be drawn about the effect of the introduction of new 
technology on the requirements of credit, since the marginal propensity 
to consume is close to unity in developing countries, it would be 
fairly safe to prognosticate increased credit requirements on the basis 
the anticipated movements of Ip and 1^. However, one aspect is abundantly
To an extent there will be a degree of replacement of traditional 
farm inputs by new farm inputs, but overall Ip will tend to decline 
as pruchased inputs are increasingly substituted for inputs 
traditionally available on the farm.
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clear. An increase in the volume and extent of indebtedness is not
necessarily an economically repugnant development as implied by
Crawford, [16] in fact it may well indicate a favourable trend of
2adoption of better production practices.
At a time when developing countries are increasingly switching 
their attention to creating institutions for the timely and adequate 
supply of the credit needs of farmers, it is pertinent to examine 
whether the shift in emphasis is justified. The "need-creed" view 
of credit stresses the importance of credit for modernising agriculture. 
In essence the argument is that savings in traditional agriculture 
are relatively small while modernisation brings with it a greater 
requirement for working capital as well as fixed investment. This 
increased requirement can only be met by large doses of credit injected 
into the rural sector. In contrast, it is countered [76] that the above 
view is unnecessarily exaggerated in that it presumes that massive doses 
of expensive inputs hold the key to increased production/productivity. 
Often what is required is a mere improvement in crop husbandry 
techniques. Besides, the transition from a traditional low productivity 
phase to a modern high productivity era is not accomplished overnight.
In so far as the change is gradual which is consistent with the high 
degree of risk-aversion normally associated with peasant agriculture, 
the requirement of additional funds in any particular time period will 
be small and can easily be met from the higher incomes and therefore 
higher savings of the farmers.^ In essence therefore the implication is
It would be an undesirable development if the increased indebtedness 
was not accompanied by an improvement in the capacity to repay.
This seems to ignore the point that a minor improvement in production 
techniques may make only a small difference to income. Given the fact 
that the marginal propensity to consume is generally close to unity, 
it is unlikely that savings will increase.
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that credit is necessary only when farmers lacking purchased inputs 
are unable to generate sufficient domestic savings either because the 
inputs required are large or indivisible or because there is a long 
gestation period between investment and returns. This view lends 
credence to the proposition that credit is an "accelerator" of agricul­
tural development rather than essential to it [17].
Without entering into the polemics of the significance of >
credit or otherwise, it is interesting to observe that both strands of
thought pursued to their logical conclusion would seem to suggest the
hypothesis that the demand for credit is unlikely to alter appreciably
in the absence of new profitable technology i.e. in a situation
characterised by stagnant technology. Acceptance of this dictum, apart
from reinforcing the Shultzian belief in farmers' rationality and
efficiency of resource allocation in traditional agriculture [18] would
also serve to put the role of credit in agricultural development in its
proper perspective. An empirical examination of the above hypothesis
bristles with conceptual difficulties. The most important concept here
is "stagnant technology". What constitutes new and profitable technology
as opposed to stagnant technology is a matter of definition. For this
purpose it is assumed that prior to the introduction of the High
Yielding Varieties Programme in 1966-67, Indian agriculture was
4characterised by stagnant technology. If credit is not a significantly 
important variable in such a situation, then the cultivators debt should
This delineation in time may be objected to on the grounds that 
technology was not really stagnant in the pre HYVP era. Although 
there is some substance in the objection, there is little doubt 
that significant changes in technology were the direct result of 
the introduction of the HYVP.
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remain almost unchanged during the period and any increase in the debt 
should be largely explained by other factors such as an increase in 
loans for consumption.^
Data from the All India Rural Credit Survey 1951-52 [23] 
and the All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1962-62 [58] shows 
that the outstanding debt per cultivator increased from Rs 364 in 
1951-2 to Rs 473 in 1961-2 i.e. a growth rate of 3% per annum or 30% 
over the decade. This increase may merely reflect inflation, so for 
purposes of comparison, the figures for 1961-2 have to be deflated for 
the price increase. According to the Consumer Prices (General Index)
[20] there was an increase of 20% in prices during the decade. Therefore, 
out of the 30% increase in the debt per cultivator between 1951 and 
1961, 20% can be expalined by inflation.
A purpose-wise analysis of borrowing for the two surveys 
discloses that household and non-farm expenses accounted for 57.9% of 
the total borrowings of cultivators in 1951-52, but that this increased 
to 64.3% in 1961-62, i.e. by 6%. Therefore about 6% of the increase in 
the debt per cultivator is explained by the increased loans for 
consumption. A likely reason for the growing indebtedness for meeting 
consumption needs can be ascribed to higher expectations brought about 
by the increasing monetisation of the rural economy as a result of and 
in turn leading to opening up of the rural area. Thus 26% of the 30%
It could be argued that with the increase in rural population the 
size of holdings would decrease leading to a reduction in the 
marketed surplus and hence a greater requirement of both consumption 
and production credit. However, it is well known that the land 
frontier in India was reached only in the 1960s and the average size 
of holdings did not alter appreciably. Therefore this limitation 
is not applicable.
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increase in the debt per cultivator can be attributed to inflation and 
an increase in consumption loans. The balance 4% increase was
probably due to a host of other factors including an increase in the 
total cropped area. Perhaps a small component of the balance was due 
to an increase in production credit reflecting minor changes in production 
techniques over the period. Therefore the hypothesis that the requirement 
for production credit is likely to remain constant in a technologically 
stagnant period would appear to be valid within the limitations imposed 
by the definition of such a period.
This conclusion is reinforced by an analysis of the increase
in rural indebtedness between 1951-2 and 1971-2. Total rural indebtedness
in 1971-2 was Rs 39210 millions which was an increase of 423% over
0
1951 [21]. During the same period, population increased by 52%, there 
was an 120% increase in prices due to inflation as measured by the 
Consumer Prices (General Index), and total cropped area increased by 
26% [20] making a total of 198% increase attributable to increases in 
population, prices and area. A substantial proportion of the balance of 
225% increase in rural indebtedness can no doubt be attributed to 
significant changes in production technology ushered in by the HYVP 
introduced in the mid 1960s. This is supported by studies which show 
that the costs of cultivation due to the introduction of "modern" inputs 
after the mid 1960s have risen steeply [22].
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the borrowing per cultivator family
A more accurate indicator would be the increase in the number of 
cultivators rather than the increase in population. However, since 
the definition of cultivators underwent a change in the 1971 
Census, data relating to the number of cultivators are not comparable.
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and details of borrowing according to purpose.
TABLE 2.1
BORROWING PER CULTIVATOR FAMILY
Year Borrowing per Family (Rs)
1951-2 209
1961-2 205
1970-1 376
Sources: RBI: All India Rural Credit Survey (AIRCS) 1951-2 (23)
RBI: All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey (AIRDIS) 1961-2 (5E
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER): Credit
Requirements for Agriculture. (42)
TABLE 2.2
ANALYSIS OF CULTIVATOR BORROWING BY PURPOSE
Purpose Per cent of 1951-2
amoun
1961-2
borrowed in 
1970-1
Capital expenditure on farm 31.5 22.1 29.8
Current expenditure on farm 10.6 13.5 22.6
Household and non-farm expenses 57.9 64.3 47.6
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Same as Table 2.1
It is interesting to observe that the borrowing for capital expenditure 
on the farm declined from 31.5% in 1951-2 to 22.2% in 1961-2 despite a 
relative increase in the borrowing for current expenditure on the farm. 
This decline was not only in per centage terms but in absolute terms
It is conceivable that to an extent, which is difficult to quantify, 
the equality in 1951 and 1961 figures reflect problems associated 
with supply of credit which underscores the inequality of demand and 
supply.
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as well. In fact it has been noted that "on an average the capital 
expenditure on agriculture per cultivating household was Rs 124 in 
1961-2 as compared to Rs 181 in 1952-2" [19]. This decline of 46% in 
the average investment on the farm as brought out by the figures was in 
reality much greater if allowance is made for inflation, which as 
indicated earlier, was 20% during the decade. Perhaps the fact that 
during the decade land reform legislation was put on the Statute books 
in most States but very little attempt was made to implement the reforms, 
provides the answer to this alarming development. The fear of "land to 
the tiller" type of slogans dissuaded landlords from making capital 
improvments on their land while at the same time since land was not 
actually transferred to the tenants or the security of tenure materially 
enhanced, it prevented the tenants from investing on the farm.
2.2 Supply of Credit:
The channels of agricultural credit in India can broadly be 
divided into two - institutional (or formal) and non-institutional (or 
informal). Chart 1 indicates the various agencies distributing credit. 
Despite the plethora of institutional agencies, non-formal sources 
continue to be the most important conduit (Table 2.3). Three facets 
of agricultural credit in India deserve comment. Firstly, institutional 
sources provide only one-third of the credit requirements. Secondly, 
co-operatives continue to be the main institutional source and 
thirdly, even though the commercial banks' share of borrowings increased 
from less than 1% to 2.4%, their overall contribution was still quite 
meagre in 1971-2.
Amongst the non-institutional sources, moneylenders 
(agricultural and professional) constitute the largest source of supply
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TABLE 2.3
PROPORTION OF AGRICULTURAL BORROWINGS FROM DIFFERENT AGENCIES
Agency (Percentages; 1951-2
all
1961-
cultivators)
-2 1971-2
Government 3.3 ) 2.6 ) 7.1 )
Cooperatives 3.1 j 7.3 15.5 j 18.7 22.0 j 31.5
Commercial Banks 0.9 ) 0.6 ) 2.4 )
Non-formal sources 92.7 81.3 68.5
Sources: AIRCS 1951-2 (23)
AIRDIS 1961-2 (58)
RBI: All India Debt and Investment Survey 1971-2
(Table 2.4). A significant point to note here is that between 1951-2 and 
1961-2, the share of agricultural moneylenders increased from 25% to 36%.
TABLE 2.4
PROPORTION OF BORROWINGS FROM NON-FORMAL SOURCES
Agency (Percentages; all cultivators) 1951-2 1961-2 1971-2
Friends and Relatives 14.2 8.8 13.1
Landlords and Others 3.3 14.5 10.5
Agricultural Moneylenders 24.9 36.0 23.0
Professional Moneylenders 44.8 13.2 13.1
Traders and 
Agents
Commission 5.5 8.8 8.8
92.7 81.3 68.5
Source: Same as Table 2.3
The explanation offered by the All India Rural Credit Review Committee 
1969 [19] that "(it) reflects the growing prosperity of the large
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cultivators" appears to be inconsistent. Surely if "modem practices" 
available at that time were reasonably profitable, the surplus funds 
would have been ploughed back into agriculture, unless of course, the 
rates of interest charged were exorbitantly high - a factor not borne 
out by the Survey of 1961-2. A more plausible explanation for the growing 
importance of agriculturist moneylenders would seem to be because 
firstly, a number of legal steps were taken to curb the activities of 
professional moneylenders. Secondly, agriculturists found it more 
profitable to lend investable funds rather than to invest them on 
their farms, which apart from reflecting the uncertainties caused by 
the apprehension of land reforms, points to what has been hypothesised 
earlier, i.e. the requirement for credit especially production credit 
is likely to be low in the absence of new profitable technology.
2.2.1 Formal Sources I: Government
Before the role of the Government as a provider of credit is 
discussed, it would be germane to point out that according to the 
Indian Constitution, agriculture is a State subject. State Government 
loans to cultivators began essentially as distress taccavi - which 
were loans extended by the Government to mitigate the hardships caused 
by natural calamities, e.g. famines, floods, fires etc. But gradually 
and ostensibly because of the slow development of other institutional 
agencies, taccavi loans began to be extended to agriculture also by 
all State Governments having variants of the Land Improvement Loans 
Act of 1883 and the Agriculturists' Loans Act of 1884 on their statute 
books.
Generally taccavi loans are much sought after by cultivators
2 4 .
b e c a u s e  th e y  c a r r y  a low r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  do n o t  a lw ays have  t o  be
r e p a i d  on t im e ,  have s im p le r  s e c u r i t y  r e q u i r e m e n ts  th a n  o t h e r  s o u rc e s
o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r e d i t  and a r e  a v a i l a b l e  even to  th o s e  who a r e  n o t
e l i g i b l e  f o r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r e d i t  from o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g
t h a t  t a c c a v i  lo a n s  whose c o n t in u a n c e  h a s  been  v ig o r o u s l y  s u p p o r t e d  by
v a r i o u s  S t a t e  G overnm ents a s  a t r a n s i t i o n a l  c h a n n e l  o f  c r e d i t
( t r a n s i t i o n a l  t i l l  such  t im e  as  c o o p e r a t i v e s  and o t h e r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l
a g e n c i e s  a r e  b u i l t  up) i n  f a c t  b e a r s  no r e l a t i o n  to  t h e  a c t u a l
0
d e v e lo p m en t  o f  o t h e r  a g e n c i e s  in  a S t a t e .  For i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  h i g h e s t  
p e r c e n ta g e  i . e .  8.3% o f  t a c c a v i  b o r ro w in g s  and 20.4% o f  o u t s t a n d i n g s  o f  
Government lo a n s  were in  M a h a ra s h t r a  w here c o o p e r a t i v e  and com m erc ia l  
bank c r e d i t  was r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  d e v e lo p e d ,  w hereas  in  B ih a r  w here t h e s e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  have  n o t  been  d e v e lo p e d  t o  t h e  same e x t e n t ,  Government 
l o a n s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  1% o f  t o t a l  b o r ro w in g s  and 4.4% o f  t o t a l  o u t s t a n d i n g s .  
T h is  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  t h e  s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  t h e  r a i s o n  d ' e t r e  o f  t h e s e  lo a n s  
i s  n o t  w hat i t  i s  s t a t e d  t o  be -  a s u s p i c i o n  w hich t e n d s  t o  be s t r e n g t h e n e d  
by d a t a  throw n up by a s tu d y  c o n d u c te d  by th e  N a t io n a l  C o u n c i l  o f  A p p l ie d  
Economic R e se a rc h  (NCAER) f o r  1970-1 [4 2 ] .  A cco rd ing  t o  t h i s  s t u d y ,  
t h e  h i g h e s t  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  b o r ro w in g s  from Government -  a t  v e ry  low r a t e s  
o f  i n t e r e s t  -  a s  a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t o t a l  b o r ro w in g s ,  was n o t  by s m a l l  
f a rm e r s  b u t  by fa rm e rs  i n  t h e  m idd le  c a t e g o r y  (T ab le  2 . 6 ) .
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  even i n  1 9 5 1 -2 ,  t h e  b i g  c u l t i v a t o r s  b o rrow ed  n e a r l y  
f o u r  t im e s  th e  amount b o rrow ed  by th e  medium c u l t i v a t o r s  and r o u g h ly  t e n  
t im e s  t h a t  o f  t h e  s m a l l  from  Government [2 3 ] .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  d i s p u t e  t h e  v iew o f  t h e  A l l  I n d i a  R u ra l  C r e d i t  Survey  Committee 1951-2
In  a s e n s e ,  t h e  b u lk  o f  a l l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c r e d i t  comes from 
Government ( S t a t e  and C e n t r a l ) . However, w h i le  funds  f o r  t a c c a v i  a r e  
e n t i r e l y  from Government r e s o u r c e s ,  a p a r t  o f  t h e  funds  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  
and com m erc ia l  ban k s  a r e  from p u b l i c  d e p o s i t s .
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that taccavi was "... little else than the ill-performed disbursement 
of inadequate moneys by an ill-suited agency".
TABLE 2.5
LOANS AND OUTSTANDINGS BY CULTIVATORS FROM GOVERNMENT IN 1961-2
Cash loans borrowed from Cash loans outstanding 
Government as a percent- from Government as a 
State age of total loans percentage of total
borrowed in 1961-2 outstandings as on
30.6.62
1. Andhra Pradesh 0.5 1.8
2. Assam 4.5 10.1
3. Bihar 1.0 4.4
4. Gujrat 1.1 3.9
5. Jammu & Kashmir - 0.3
6. Kerala 1.1 4.6
7. Madhya Pradesh 1.2 4.5
8. Madras 2.7 3.1
9. Maharashtra 8.3 20.4
10. Mysone 6.2 4.6
11. Orissa 4.2 12.2
12. Punjab 2.1 3.8
13. Rajasthan - 0.8 2.9
14. Uttar Pradesh 2.6 3.3
15. West Bengal 2.1 16.4
All India 2.6 5.5
Source: AIRDIS 1961-2 (58)
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TABLE 2.6
BORROWINGS FROM GOVERNMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BORROWINGS 
OF VARIOUS SIZE GROUPS OF CULTIVATORS IN 1970-71
Size (in hectares) Borrowing from Government as a 
Percentage of total borrowing
0-2 3.2
2-4 5.3
4-6 4.1
6 and above 2.4
All holdings 3.6
Source: NCAER (42)
2.2.2 Formal Sources II: Cooperatives 
(a) Societies
The cooperative credit arrangements in India which date back 
to the Acts of 1904 were a synthesis of the ideas of the Rochdale 
Pioneers and the principles embodied in the Raiffeisen societies. The 
principles of open membership, one-man-one vote were derived from the 
former, while the concept of unlimited liability can be traced to the 
latter. Cooperation in India was based on official initiative with the 
underlying hope that cooperatives established under official initiative 
would soon begin to act as voluntary organisations. It was therefore 
"not so much a movement as a governmental policy" [24]. The emphasis 
in cooperation in the earlier phases was on credit (and continues to 
be so even today) primarily to curb the economic and socially undesirable 
repercussions of the activities of moneylenders and additionally to 
instigate the process of agricultural development by mobilising the 
financial surpluses especially of the larger farmers in the rural
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sector and ensuring its investment in the same sector.
The primary agricultural credit societies (PACS) essentially 
advance short and medium term loans. Table 2.7 gives a summary of the 
progress of activitiesof PACS. By 1973-74, there were 154,000 PACS 
'covering' about 95% of the villages in the country. Interestingly, 
and for obvious reasons, the Raiffeisen principle of unlimited liability 
has increasingly made way for limited liability of the societies. In 
1951-2 the ratio of limited liabiility to unlimited liability societies 
was 4:10, while in 1973-74 the ratio had changed to 35:10. The number 
of dormant societies has been decreasing over time due to revitalisation 
measures taken up in the mid 1960s. However, a continuing depressing 
feature has been the large incidence of overdues. The percentage of 
overdues to outstandings has been rising since 1961-2.
Certain aspects of credit from PACS merit attention. First,
while the total loans issued between 1970-1 and 1973-4 increased by
32%, the proportion of borrowing members to cultivator households
increased by only 1% which indicates that loans have largely gone to the
same members every year. In this context, while Lipton's [5] assertion
that almost every villager "repays" yearly and borrows again a day later,
may be an exaggerated account, it does give rise to the reasonable
suspicion that a large volume of these "borrowings" are in reality book
adjustments. Second, loans issued are heavily skewed in favour of
short term (ST) credit. The proportion of ST loans to total loans
9issued has been around 90%. Third, out of 1.54 lakh societies in 
1973-4, only about 60,000 societies (40%) had paid secretaries to manage
9 A lakh is the equivalent of 100,000.
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TABLE 2.7
PROGRESS OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SOCIETIES
1951-52 1961-62 1970-71 1973-74
1. No. of societies (lakhs) 1.08 2.12 1.6 1.54
2. No. of villages covered (lakhs) - 4.23 5.35 5.45
3. Membership (lakhs) 48 170 310 350
4. No. of dormant socieites (000s) - 41 20 18
5. % of borrowing members to 
cultivator households
17.8 36 37
6. Total share capital (Rs crores) 9 58 - -
7. Govt, contribution to share cap. - 6 - -
8. Owned funds (Rs crores) 18 76 - -
9. Deposits (Rs crores) 4 15 69 89
10. Short terms loans issued (Rs crores) - 183 519 690
11. MT loans issued (Rs crores) - 20 58 71
12. Total loans issued (Rs crores) 24 203 577 760
13. Loans outstanding (Rs crores) 34 219 784 806
14. Overdues (Rs crores) 9 44 322 443
15. % of overdues to outstandings 25.3 20.3 41.0 42
16. Av. share cap. per member (Rs) 19 34 66 78
17. Av. Deposit/member (Rs) 9 9 22 26
18. Av. loans advanced per member 51 119 514 583
19. Av. membership per society 44 80 193 227
20. Av. share cap. per society (Rs 000) 0.8 3 13 17
21. Av. deposit/society (Rs 000) 0.4 0.7 4 5.8
22. Av. loans advanced per society 
(Rs 000)
2 10
Sources: RBI: All india Rural Credit Review
RBI: Statistical Statement Relating
Committee 
to Coop
(AIRCRC) 
Movement
1969 (19) 
in India (40
their affairs. Fourth, out of Rs 322 crores overdue in 1970-71, 15% was 
overdue for more than 3 years and about 50% was overdue for less than one
10 A crore represents 10 million.
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one year. Fifth, in addition to supplying agricultural credit, the 
PACS also undertook other activities such as sale of farm requisities and 
consumer goods (Table 2.8) It is noteworthy that the proportion of its
TABLE 2.8
OTHER ACTIVITIES OF PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES (Rs in crones)
Activities 1970-1 1973-4
Value of farm requisities supplied 128.6 224.1
Consumer goods distributed 93 183.3
Agricultural produce marketed 13.5 19.9
TOTAL 235.1 427.3
Source: Statistical Statements relating to Coop Movement in India. (40)
other activities to loan activities increased from 41% in 1970-1 to 
57% in 1973-4. Sixth, a classification of loans according to size 
issued by PACS (computed from Table 2.9) discloses that loans to small
TABLE 2.9
CLASSIFICATION OF LOANS BY PACS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF HOLDINGS
(Rs in crones)
Size 1970-1 1973-4 Percentage increase
Up to 1 hectare 58.37 61.94 6
1-2 hectares 90.11 124.32 38
2-4 hectares 138.53 176.07 27
4-8 hectares 137.11 146.47 7
Above 8 hectares 106.97 91.38 -15
Tenants 18.98 20.60 8
Agric. labourers 5.56 7.64 37
Others 1.37 2.99 118
Total 577.88 761.67 32
Source: Statistical Statements relating to Coop Movement in India. (40)
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farmers (less than 2 hectares) were 26% of total loans in 1970-1 
but declined to 24% in 1973-4 even though total loans advanced 
increased by 32% between 1970-1 and 1973-4.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 give the short and medium term loans 
classified by purpose. Seasonal agricultural operations accounted for 
the bulk (over 90%) of the short term loans while the purchase of 
pump sets and cattle were the two most material items under medium 
loans. Gross cropped area for the entire country was 161.5 million 
hectares while total loans issued by the PACS were Rs 7600 million in 
1973-4 which gives an average per hectare credit availability of a 
mere Rs 47.
TABLE 2.10
SHORT TERM LOANS BY PURPOSE ISSUED BY PACS (Rs in crones)
Purpose 1970-1 1973-74
1. Seasonal agricultural operations 469.68 643.51
(90%) (93%)
2. Purchase of agricultural implements 5.43 2.55
(1%) (0%)
3. Marketing of crops 17.28 15.11
(3%) (2%)
4. Processing of agricultural produce 6.80 1.92
(1%) (0%)
5. Industrial purposes 0.3 0.4
(0.6%) (0%)
6. Consumption loans 5.24 5.67
(1%) (0.8%)
7. Other purposes 14.58 21.38
(3%) (3%)
8. Total 519.31 690.52
Figures in brackets are percentage to total.
Source: Statistical Statements relating to Coop Movement in India.(40)
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TABLE 2.11
MEDIUM TEEM LOANS BY PURPOSE ISSUED BY PACS (Rs in crones)
Purpose 1970-1 1973-4
1. Sinking of or repair to wells 7.96 6.87
(14%) (10%)
2. Purchase of machinery (pump sets) 9.10 10.43
(16%) (15%)
3. Purchase of cattle 8.44 9.99
(14%) (14%)
4. Minor improvements to land 4.86 5.69
(8%) (8%)
5. Other agricultural purposes 20.61 22.47
(35%) (32%)
6. Other purposes 7.56 15.68
(13%) (22%)
7. Total 58.54 71.15
Figures in brackets are percentages to total.
Source: Statistical Statements relating to Coop Movement in India.(40)
(b) Land Development Banks
Land Development Banks (LDBs) supply the long term credit 
requirements (occasionally, also the medium term) of the agricultural 
sector. While a uniform pattern of organisation does not exist for 
the entire country, most States have a Central LDB at the State level and 
primary LDBs at the district or taluka levels. In some States a unitary 
structure prevails with a Central LDB at the State level and its 
branches operating at district and lower levels. Initially, the bulk 
of the loans issued by LDBs were for discharge of prior debts and 
redemption of mortgages [23] (in fact the banks were called land mortgage 
banks in the earlier days). Table 2.12 indicates the performance of Land 
Development Banks over time - it is only after the 1960s that the volume 
of lending increased substantially.
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TABLE 2.12
PROGRESS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT BANKS
1950-1 1960-1 1970-1 1973-4
1. No. of banks
(a) Central 5 18 19 19
(b) Primary 286 463 865 857
2. Loans advanced during the 
year to individuals 
(Rs crones)
1.38 11.62 170.36 158.09
3. Loans outstanding with 
individuals
6.59 37.74 786.51 828.25
Source: Indian Agriculture in Brief (15th edition) (20)
2.2.3 Formal Sources III: Commercial Banks
Reference was made above (Table 2.3) that prior to the 
seventies, the proportion of agricultural credit distributed by 
commercial banks to total credit was less than 1%. However since 1969 
(after the nationalisation of 14 major commercial banks) efforts have 
been made to expand commercial bank credit to agriculture. Noticeable 
amongst these efforts has been the expansion in numbers of branches 
of these banks (Table 2.13). Impressive as this may seem, certain 
negative features invite attention. First, after the initial 
euphoria of nationalisation, the pace of branch expansion declined 
considerably. This is highlighted by a comparison between 1969 and 
1973 on the one hand and between 1973 and 1978 on the other. This 
contrast is further sharpened if from the June 1978 figures, 1,277 
branches of the Regional Rural Banks (started in October 1975) and 
1,500 branches of the non-nationalised branches are excluded. Second, 
an analysis of the timing of opening of new branches is very intriguing 
(Table 2.14). The frantic expansion in the last quarter of every year
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TABLE 2.13
BRANCH EXPANSION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Centre June 1969 June 1972 June '1978
11Rural 1832 (22.4) 5561 (36.2) 11802 (42.1
12Semi Urban 3322 (40.1) 4723 (30.8) 7586 (27.1
Urban and ^
Metropolitan
3108 (37.5) 5078 (33.0) 8628 (30.8
Total 8262 (100) 15362 (100) 28016 (100)
Figures in brackets are percentages to total. 
Source: RBI: Annual Reports. (25)
TABLE 2.14
QUARTERLY EXPANSION OF BANK BRANCHES
Calendar
Year
Increase during quarter ending 
March June September December
Total Annual 
Increases
1970 335 775 388 665 2165
1971 357 472 313 659 1801
1972 324 311 409 710 1754
1973 285 338 409 732 1764
1974 197 2 36 397 847 1677
1975 203 347 501 1223 2274
1976 244 522 792 1643 3201
1977 420 727 ‘ 856 1338 3341
Source: RBI: Annual Reports.(25)
would seem to suggest that banks have adopted a branch expansion policy 
as an end in itself more as a "target-chasing-window-dressing" manoeuvre
^  Rural centres are those with a population of less than 10,000.
12 Semi-urban centres are those with a population between 10,000 and
100,000.
Those with a population of over 100,000.13
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to present a "rosy picture of branch expansion in their year-end 
annual account" [25] rather than as a means of increasing their 
activities in the rural sector. Third, combining rural and semi- 
urban branches (Table 2.13) shows that their growth was from 62.5% 
of total number of branches in 1969 to 69.2% in 1978 which is not a 
particularly impressive rate of growth and indicates that rural branches 
have grown at the cost of semi-urban branches. Fourth, an analysis of 
direct institutional finance to agriculture for the year ending June 1977 
reveals that the short term to long term lending ratio which was 2.38 
for all institutional credit taken together, was only 1.26 for 
commercial bank credit. This points to the preference of commercial 
banks for term loans e.g. tractor loans. Fifth, as with loans from 
cooperatives, there is a bias in commercial bank lending in favour of 
larger farmers, especially with term loans (Table 2.15).
TABLE 2.15
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANK AGRICULTURAL LENDING 
ACCORDING TO HOLDING SIZE
(In percentages:
k
1975-76)
Type of Loan Total Up to 2.5 
acres
2.5 to 5 
acres
5 to 10 
acres
10 acres 
and above
Short term 100 32.4 21.8 19.7 26.1
Term 100 11.8 11.7 14.7 61.8
Source: RBI Annual Reports (25)
2.3 Credit Gap:
Thus far consideration has been given to the supply and 
requirements of credit for agriculture. It is difficult to 
establish whether the supply has been adequate to meet the requirements
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p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  in s u r m o u n ta b le  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e s t i m a t i n g  th e  
demand f o r  c r e d i t .  Demand i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i c e  
( c o s t  o f  c r e d i t )  and t h e  r e t u r n  ( th e  m a r g in a l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  c a p i t a l )  
b o th  o f  w hich  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e te r m in e  and q u a n t i f y  e s p e c i a l l y  
when consum ption  c r e d i t  i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  The m a r g in a l  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  c a p i t a l  demanded by im p o v e r is h e d  fa rm e r s  a t  a lm o s t  any 
p r i c e  t o  keep  body and s o u l  t o g e t h e r  i s  n o t  am enable  t o  d i r e c t  o r  
s im p le  c o m p u ta t io n .  B ut t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l a r g e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h e  
o v e r a l l  c r e d i t  s u p p ly  i s  from n o n - fo rm a l  s o u r c e s  a t  h ig h  p r i c e s ,  
i s  s u g g e s t i v e  o f  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  o v e r a l l  r e q u i r e m e n ts  a t  a 
r e a s o n a b le  p r i c e  a r e  i n  e x c e s s  o f  s u p p ly .
I f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  m ee t in g  consum ption  n eed s  
i s  e x c lu d e d ,  t h e n  i t  i s  c o m p a r a t iv e ly  e a s y  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  o v e r a l l  
p r o d u c t i o n  c r e d i t  r e q u i r e m e n t .  The A l l  I n d i a  R u ra l  C r e d i t  Review 
Com m ittee 1969 had  e s t i m a t e d  Rs 2000 c r o r e s  as  t h e  s h o r t  te rm  c r e d i t  
r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  1973 -74 , Rs 300 c r o r e s  a s  t h e  medium te rm  r e q u i r e m e n t  
f o r  e a ch  y e a r  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  1969-70 t o  1973-74 and Rs 100 c r o r e s  as  
t h e  a n n u a l  lo n g  te rm  r e q u i r e m e n t  o v e r  t h e  same p e r i o d .  A g a in s t  t h i s ,
w
t h e  s u p p ly  o f  s h o r t  te rm  c r e d i t  by c o o p e r a t i v e s  i n  1973-74 was 
Rs 690 c r o r e s  and even  i f  t h e  b o r ro w in g s  from com m erc ia l  banks  and 
Government ( t a c c a v i )  i s  i n c l u d e d ,  t h e  s u p p ly  would  s t i l l  be l e s s  th a n  
50% o f  t h e  p r o j e c t e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  F o r  te rm  lo a n s  (medium and long) 
t h e  s u p p ly  was Rs 71 c r o r e s  by p r im a ry  c o o p e r a t i v e  s o c i e t i e s ,  Rs 158 
c r o r e s  by l a n d  d e v e lo p m en t  ban k s  and Rs 60 c r o r e s  by com m erc ia l  banks  
making a t o t a l  o f  Rs 289 c r o r e s  i . e .  a s h o r t f a l l  o f  28%. Thus t h e  c r e d i t  
gap f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  c r e d i t  was t h e  w i d e s t  f o r  s h o r t  te rm  c r e d i t .
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CHAPTER 3
THE PRICE OF CREDIT
3 .1  Are A g r i c u l t u r a l  I n t e r e s t  R a te s  High?
C o n s id e r a b l e  c o n t r o v e r s y  s u r r o u n d s  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o f  
l o a n s  i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r .  Some a c c e p t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a s  h ig h  
and have  s o u g h t  t o  f i n d  e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  them  [51] w h i le  o t h e r s  [45] have 
t a k e n  th e  v iew t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  much l e s s  e x t o r t i o n a t e  th a n  w hat 
i s  a c c e p te d  by th e  fo rm e r .  A g a in ,  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
lo a n s  a r e  w id e ly  c i t e d  a s  an i m p o r ta n t  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  low volume o f  
l e n d i n g  to  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  g e n e r a l  and s m a l l  f a rm e rs  in  p a r t i c u l a r  [4 7 ] .
The te rm s  low o r  h ig h  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  and d i s c u s s i o n  
f r e q u e n t l y  becomes a m a t t e r  o f  v a lu e  ju d g em e n t.  The l i t e r a t u r e  on th e  
s u b j e c t  i s  l i b e r a l l y  p e p p e re d  w i th  t h e  w ords ' l o w ' ,  ' h i g h '  ' a p p r o p r i a t e '  
e t c . ,  b u t  few a t t e m p t s  have  been  made t o  u n r a v e l  t h e  G ord ion  k n o t  and 
a r r i v e  a t  any s p e c i f i c  r a t e  o r  ran g e  o f  r a t e s .  A cco rd in g  t o  t h e  W orld 
Bank [63] one benchm ark f o r  m e a su r in g  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  r a t e s  i s  
t h e  p r i c e  t h a t  a Development F in a n ce  Company would have t o  pay  t o  
m o b i l i s e  funds  " p lu s  a r e a s o n a b le  s p r e a d " .  T h i s ,  a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  by
w
t h e  Bank i t s e l f ,  can be a s c e r t a i n e d  o n ly  when f i n a n c i a l  m a rk e ts  a r e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  and  w e l l  d e v e lo p e d  -  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w hich do n o t  g e n e r a l l y  
h o ld  f o r  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  where f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a rk e ts  
i s  t h e  r u l e  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  e x c e p t io n  [7 5 ] .
In  I n d i a  u rb an  f i n a n c i a l  m a rk e ts  a r e  r e a s o n a b ly  w e l l  d e v e lo p e d  
oweing t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ' s  g ro w th .  One means o f  j u d g in g  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t o  compare them w i th  th o s e  
o f f e r e d  t o  i n d u s t r y  and commerce. The r e l e n d i n g  r a t e s  o f  t h e  two 
D evelopm ent F in a n ce  Companies in  I n d i a  -  t h e  ICICI ( I n d u s t r i a l  C r e d i t  
and In v e s tm e n t  C o r p o r a t io n  o f  In d ia )  and  t h e  IDBI ( I n d u s t r i a l  D evelopm ent
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Bank of India) in 1974 for medium and long term loans varied between 
8.5 to 12% with a simple average of 10.25%. At the same time, the 
weighted average of the interest rates on commercial bank credit 
provided as direct finance to agriculture were at a higher rate of 
10.8% [64]. Even if allowance is made for the fact that commercial 
banks accounted for only 18% of the institutional credit to agriculture, 
the bulk of institutional credit coming from cooperatives which carry 
a slightly lower rate, (about 0.5% less) the overall average rate for 
industry and agriculture works out to be at approximately the same level. 
Thus if it can be assumed that the interest rates in industry reflect 
the true scarcity of capital, then the institutional rates in agriculture 
cannot be said to be low by comparison. However, non-institutional credit 
at substantially higher rates account for over 60% of the agricultural 
loans, so it could be argued that the rates in agriculture are higher
and that a case for lower rates could be made out.
3.2 Theory of Agricultural Interest Rates
Theoretically, the rate of interest charged on agricultural
loans reflects (a) the lenders' opportunity costs, (b) the administrative
cost of delivery and collection, (c) the risk premium arising from losses
from loan defaults, (d) the inflationary premium which is the exposure
to loss in the real loan portfolio value as a result of inflation and
(e) monopoly profit if the lender functions in a monopolistic market.
The interest rate can therefore be represented by the functional
relationship:
I = f(0, A, S, P, M) _ (i)
where I = rate of interest
0 = lenders opportunity costs
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A = administrative costs 
S = risk premium 
P = inflationary premium 
M = monolopy profit
3-2.1 Opportunity and Administrative Costs;
The opportunity cost of money from the lender's viewpoint is 
the "pure" rate of interest [52] and it may be taken to be the rate of 
return on gilt edged bonds, or more simply the Bank Rate. The 
administrative costs depend on a number of factors such as the amount 
and period of the loan, staffing pattern etc. It can be reduced if 
(i) loans cover larger amounts, (ii) loans are for extended periods,
(iii) lending is to groups of borrowers who then distribute the loans 
amongst themselves^ (iv) efforts are made to implement the simple but 
not always favoured method of effective cost-return analysis in personnel 
management.
3.2.2 Risk Premium:
V
The risk premium is applied to take account of the fact that 
a proportion of loans are not repaid. Following Bhaduri [51] if
r = the rate of interest to be charged 
and q = the proportion of loans the lender expects 
will be defaulted, and assuming that this expectation is realised and 
that defaulting is less than 100%,
Yi = r (1 - q)
where Yi is the interest income accruing to the lender per unit of loan
This in fact was one of the theoretical justifications given for 
the introduction of cooperative credit.
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a d v a n ce d .
B ut h i s  o v e r a l l  income (Y) from le n d in g  p e r  u n i t  o f  lo a n  
t r a n s a c t i o n  w i l l  be i n t e r e s t  income (Yi) minus th e  c a p i t a l  l o s s  q ,  i . e .
Y = Yi -  q
= r  (1-q)  -  q
o r  r  = (Y + q)(1 -  q)
I f  f o r  e x am p le ,  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  10% and i t  i s  assum ed 
t o  be e q u a l  t o  Y, i . e .  Y = o . lO  and t h e  d e f a u l t  r a t e  i s  25% i . e .  q = 0 .2 5 ,  
t h e n  th e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  to  be c h a rg e d  t o  com pensa te  f o r  t h e  r i s k  o f  
d e f a u l t  w i l l  b e :
( .1 0  + .25)r  = --------------------1 -  .25
= 46.7%
B ut t h i s  does  n o t  mean t h a t  t h e  income a c c r u in g  t o  t h e  l e n d e r  i s  46.7% o f  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  a d v a n ce d .  Even though  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  c h a rg e d  i s  
46.7%, h i s  income (Y) p e r  u n i t  o f  t h e  lo a n  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  10% -  th e  
b a la n c e  36.7% i s  t h e  r i s k  premium and m e re ly  c o v e rs  t h e  l o s s  o f  p r i n c i p a l  
due t o  d e f a u l t .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
c _ q (Q + o)
1 - q
where S = r i s k  premium 
q = d e f a u l t  r a t e  
Q = p r i n c i p a l
and  C = o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s
U sing th e  same f i g u r e s  in  t h e  e a r l i e r  exam ple and a ssum ing  p r i n c i p a l  to  
be 100,
25 (100 + 10)
S ” 75
36.7%
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However, both these methods of calculating the risk premium 
are based on the assumptions that the opprotunity cost of money and the 
default rate are exogeneous to the system i.e. 0 and q are independent 
of the rate of interest - assumptions which are difficult to substantiate. 
Even if it is bravely assumed that 0 is independent of the rate of 
interest and attempts are made to justify the assumption on grounds of 
underdevelopment and fragmentation of financial markets in the rural 
sector, it is difficult to get around the assumption of independence of 
q. The default rate depends on a number of factors such as the volume 
of lending, the income-variance of the borrower, the willlingness to 
repay and the rate of interest charged. If the rate of interest is 
very high, borrowers will find it exceedingly difficult to repay from 
the incremental income, and in the absence of sufficient rural savings, 
default rates are likely to go up. Therefore the assumption that 
default rates are independent of the rate of interest, would not be 
valid. In fact the probability of charging a higher interest rate to 
meet the costs of default would appear to be quite high. This has 
interesting possible implications. The lender charges a high rate of 
interest to safeguard against default, but these same high rates will 
tend to increase defaults. Thus, higher interest rates rather than 
protecting the lender against default, are likely to increase the default 
rate, which may in turn prompt the lender to increase interest rates 
further. The result is therefore likely to be ever widening circles of 
interest rates and default rates. In practice, of course, beyond a 
point no one would borrow.
It is believed by some that the higher the gross income of the 
borrower, the less he is likely to default on his loans [56]. Assuming 
a linear relationship between default rates and income, the relationship
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can be diagrammatically represented as follows:
Figure 1
Per Centage
Repayment
Gross Income (Y)
If OA is the minimum subsistence level of income, then for income less 
than OA, there will be no repayments. (However, as argued later, 
empirical evidence does not bear out this neat functional relationship).
But it may be argued that the rate of interest is inversely 
related to the rate of repayment - other factors being constant, the 
better the repayment record of a borrower or class of borrowers, the 
lower will be the risk premium, and therefore lower the rate of 
interest. Diagrammatically,
Repayment
(R)
Figure 2
Interest (I)
The curve can be expected to be asymmetric to the two axes as, on the 
one hand, no matter how good the record of repayment, the rate of 
interest cannot be zero, and on the other hand, the interest rate would
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be i n d e t e r m i n a t e  a t  z e ro  o r  n e a r  z e ro  l e v e l s  o f  repaym en t s in c e  l e n d e r s  
a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  l e n d  i f  repaym en t i s  z e r o .
Combining th e  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  d e p i c t e d  i n  F ig u r e s  2 
and  3, i . e .
R = f  (Y) (2)
and I  = f  (R) (3)
I  = f"  (Y) (4)
l e a d s  t o  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  g r o s s  income 
o f  t h e  b o r ro w e r .  I t  may be i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i th  o t h e r  a rg u m e n ts ,  t h a t  a r e  o f t e n  employed t o  j u s t i f y  h i g h e r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  s m a l l  fa rm e r  l e n d i n g .  B u t  t h e  f la w  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
i s  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e  from a number o f  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  does 
n o t  s u p p o r t  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  ( 2 ) .
3 . 2 . 3  I n f l a t i o n a r y  Premium :
I n f l a t i o n a r y  premium i s  d e s ig n e d  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r e a l  v a lu e  
o f  t h e  l e n d e r s  funds  from l o s s e s  due t o  i n f l a t i o n .  T h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  i f
Q i s  t h e  amount l e n t  f o r  n y e a r s ,  and 
R t h e  n e t  y e a r l y  re p a y m e n t ,  and
i  t h e  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  (= o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l )  
th e n  th e  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  o f  repaym en ts  r e c e i v e d  o v e r  n y e a r s  i s
I  _J*__
(1 + i ) n
T h is  m e re ly  e ch o es  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  f u t u r e  i s  d i s c o u n t e d  i . e .  a Rupee 
r e c e i v e d  a y e a r  from now i s  w o r th  l e s s  th a n  a Rupee to d a y .  I t  does  n o t  
a c c o u n t  f o r  i n f l a t i o n .
Assuming a c o n s t a n t  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  o f  x% p e r  annum, th e n
th e  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  o f  repaym en ts  i s
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(1 + i ) n ( l  + x ) n [ (1 + i )  (1 + x ) ] n
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  o v e r a l l  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  from  t h e  l e n d e r s '  p o i n t  o f  v iew 
i s  th e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  
F o r  ex am p le ,  i f  i  = 10% and x = 5% th en  t h e  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t  i s  
(1 .1 0 )  (1 .0 5 )  -  1 = 15.5%. The money o r  t h e  nom ina l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  
minus t h e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  premium i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  ' r e a l '  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .
3 . 2 . 4  Monopoly P r o f i t
An e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  u s u r i o u s  r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  c h a rg e d  in  
t h e  r u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  b a s e d  on th e  f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  r u r a l  f i n a n c i a l  
m a rk e ts  and  th e  r e s u l t a n t  monopoly power o f  t h e  l e n d e r  [5 1 ] .  As 
c o l l a t e r a l  such  as  s t a n d i n g  c r o p s ,  p ro m ise  o f  f u t u r e  l a b o u r  e t c .  a r e  
n o t  a c c e p t e d  i n  t h e  o r g a n i s e d  money m a r k e t ,  t h e  i n d i g e n t  f a rm e rs  a r e  
f o r c e d  t o  s e ek  c r e d i t  in  t h e  u n o r g a n i s e d  s e c t o r .  B h a d u r i  [51] a rg u e s  
t h a t  i t  i s  t h i s  l a c k  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  from th e  b o r r o w e r ' s  v i e w p o in t ,  
w hich  e n a b le s  th e  l e n d e r  t o  u n d e rv a lu e  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l  o f f e r e d  t o  t h e  
p o i n t  where t h e  v a lu e  o f  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l  t r a n s f e r r e d  e x c ee d s  th e  v a lu e
V
o f  t h e  lo a n  so t h a t  t h e  r i s k  o f  d e f a u l t  i s  p a s s e d  e n t i r e l y  on t o  th e  
b o r ro w e r .  As a f u r t h e r  s a f e g u a r d ,  i t  i s  a rg u e d ,  t h e  l e n d e r  t e n d s  t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  a l e v e l  where t h e  repaym en t e x c ee d s  t h e  
v a lu e  o f  c o l l a t e r a l  t r a n s f e r r e d .
At t h i s  ' e x t o r t i o n a t e ' r a t e  t h e  b o r ro w e r  would c o n s id e r  
rep a y m en t  r a t i o n a l  o n ly  i f  h i s  v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o l l a t e r a l  i s  h i g h e r  
th a n  th e  v a l u a t i o n  p l a c e d  on i t  by t h e  l e n d e r  -  he may c o n s id e r  i t  'w i s e '  
t o  d e f a u l t  i f  t h e  b u rd e n  o f  repaym en t p l u s  i n t e r e s t  ex c ee d s  h i s  p e r s o n a l
v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  c o l l a t e r a l . T h e r e f o r e ,  c o n c lu d e s  B h a d u r i ,  t h e  r u r a l
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moneylender uses interest rates to accumulate assets "through the 
transfer of undervalued collateral deliberately brought about by large 
scale default".
The above analysis is based on monopolistic imperfections 
on the supply side coupled with a highly interest-inelastic demand for 
credit. While one would not like to dismiss the monopolistic powers 
of rural lenders in India (especially in the remote tribal areas) it 
is equally true that with the advent bf higher agricultural productivity, 
the monopolistic power of lenders has been considerably reduced.
Moreover, the assumption that lenders are anxious for borrowers to 
default so as to transfer assets (land) is no longer valid because of 
land ceiling regulations.
By contrast, it is interesting that Long's [53] analysis shows 
that in India in 1951-2, the monopoly power of lenders in the agricultural 
loan market was not very great and high rural interest rates were due 
primarily on account of capital scarcity, costly administration of farm 
loans, greater risk of loss through default and the seasonality in the 
demand for credit. A more decent survey [54] of 77 villages in the 
eastern State of West Bengal, found that although production loans and 
advances were increasingly given by landlords, two-thirds of these 
advances were interest free. This would tend to refute the view that 
landowners give loans primarily by way of usury and not because of their 
interest in increasing production [55] . Moreover, this survey also 
disclosed that about two-thirds of the tenants obtained consumption loans 
from landlords and about one-third of these did not involve interest 
payments. However, it would be tenable to accept the view, that the 
closer the farmer is to minimum subsistence levels of living the higher
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the interest rate is likely to be, 157] for loans demanded in such a 
situation would be essentially for consumption and are highly interest- 
inelastic.
3• 3 Examination of Factors which Influence Determination of Interest Rates; 
Opportunity and Administrative Costs
It has been postulated above that I = f(0, A, S, P, M) . An 
attempt is made to examine this relationship with reference to data 
from the various Indian States.. Taking opportunity costs to represent 
the Bank Rate and since the Bank Rate is the same for all States, it 
can be assumed that the opportunity costs do not vary from State to 
State. Similarly, it can also be assumed that the administrative costs 
are the same in all the States as the structure and organisation of 
instutitonal credit do not vary and the forms of non-institutional credit 
are also identical.
Monopoly Power:
The risk premium, 'the inflationary premium and monopoly profit 
s are not amenable to direct measurement but proxies can be used. It is 
difficult to quantify the extent of monopoly power, but it can be argued 
that the more developed institutional credit is in an area, the less 
likely would be the monopoly power of moneylenders. Hence the spread of 
institutional credit and specifically, a rising percentage of loans 
borrowed from institutional sources to total loans borrowed, can be taken 
to indicate declining monopoly power. But it has been argued above that 
an inverse (negative) relationship can be expected between the rate of 
interest and the spread of institutional credit, which suggests a positive
46 .
relationship between the degree of monopoly power and the rate of 
interest.
From the data on borrowings by cultivators during 1961-2 [58]
classified according to the rate of interest, the average interest rate
for each State can be computed by assuming that the distribution is
normal within each class interval i.e. the mid-point of each interval is
truly representative. The States can then be ranked according to the
average rate of interest. Similarly the States can be ranked according
to the percentage of loans borrowed from institutional sources which
incidentally reflects the development of institutional credit (Table 3.1).
Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation (r') between the interest
rates and the percentage of loans borrowed from institutional sources
2yields a figure of -0.44. This tends to confirm the theoretical 
expectation of an inverse relationship between the development of 
institutional credit and interest rates and in turn signifies a positive 
relationship between interest rates and the degree of monopoly power. 
Indeed the All India Rural Credit Review Committee's rough calculations 
showed that the rate of interest declined in 1961-2 from its level in
V
1951-2 and one of the factors cited for this decline was the larger 
dependence of cultivators on institutional credit [19].
Risk Premium:
The incidence and extent of the premium added to take account 
of risk depends on a host of factors ranging from the type and severity
The significance of the value of r' has been tested by applying the 
two-tail test of significance at 5% level. Since the computed r' is
less than - 1•96 , the null hypothesis is rejected, confirming what in-1has been argued theoretically.
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of natural hazards that an area may be prone to, to the general 
attitudes of the people as far as debt redemption is concerned. While it 
is comparatively easy to list all such factors, measurement of their 
effects is extremely complex. However, it can be argued that the 
repayment performance of borrowers does to a large extent influence the 
assessment of risk in the minds of lenders. Thus repayment record can 
be used as a proxy for risk.
Taking the average repayment per cultivator household as a
percentage of the average outstanding loans per cultivator household, a
Repayment Index can be computed as in Table 3.1. A glance at this Index
and the average rates of interest in various States would tend to confirm
the association postulated between the two variables i.e. the lower this
Index, the higher the risk and hence the higher the rate of interest.
For instance, Bihar has one of the lowest figures for repayment and the
rate of interest is the highest. Spearman's coefficient of rank
3correlation is -0.2 which confirms the a priori reasoning that repayment 
is inversely related to the rate of interest. But since risk is
inversely related to payment, it follows that risk is positively
\
associated with interest.
Risk from the lender's viewpoint also depends on the financial
standing of the borrower and the type of security offered. Therefore
the type of security offered can be taken to be another proxy for 
4risk. A lender's concept of security is equivalent to that of risk 
4
Data relating to interest rates according to the financial standing 
of the borrowers (either income or stock of assets) is not available 
and hence an examination of the association between interest rates 
and financial standing, though interesting, is not possible.
Significant at 5% level of significance.3
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cover - the more a loan is secured the less risk is associated with 
lending. Even institutional sources attach importance to securities 
as shown by the fact that, even though, under the crop loan system, the 
loan is secured on crop liens and the credit limits are fixed on the 
basis of the scale of finance and acreage, several borrowers "were 
found to draw loans only up to the extent of the security limits".
Loans in excess of surety limits were made only on the security of 
tangible assets, preferably immovable property [60].
The 1961-2 All India Credit Survey classified loans according 
to the various types of security offered, viz.:
(1) Personal security
(2) Surety security or third party guarantee
(3) Crops
(4) First charge on immovable property
(5) Mortgage on immovable property
(6) Bullion and ornaments
(7) Shares of companies, Government securities and insurance 
policies
(8) Agricultural comm&dites
(9) Other movable property
(10) Any other security.
Since loans made on security of types 7, 8, 9, and 10 were negligible 
(their combined total amounting to only 0.5% of aggregate loans) they 
can be discarded from the analysis. By far the most common form of 
security was personal, which reflects both the importance of non- 
institutional credit sources in the system and the fact that loans were 
generally for short periods. Mortgage of immovable property was next 
in importance followed by third party guarantee and first charge on
50.
immovable property. Only 1.7% of aggregate loans were secured on 
bullion and ornaments while crops as security accounted for only 0.9% 
which indicates that the system of crop loans was still in its infancy 
at that time.
The safest security for the lender is that which confers 
rights on immovable property either by outright mortgage or by creating 
a first charge. Therefore a 1 igh percentage of loans outstanding on 
the security of immovable property reflects, on the one hand a higher 
degree of risk necessitating this comparatively safer form of security. 
On the other hand, in a dynamic sense, it indicates a reduction of risk 
since once the loans have been effected on such 'safe' security, the 
risk is automatically reduced. The overall effect on the rate of 
interest will depend upon the relative strengths of the two forces - one 
tending to push up the rates and the other to depress it. In fact 
Spearman's co-efficient of rank correlation between the average rates of 
interest in 1961-62 in the various States and the percentage of out­
standing loans on security of immovable property yielded a co-efficient
\of +0.01 suggesting perhaps that the two pulls almost neutralise each 
other.
Inflationary Premium:
In an inflationary situation lenders are likely to try to 
protect the real value of their loan portfolio from the effects of the 
declining value of currency. They would be influenced by the expected 
rate of inflation (rather than the real rate) in assessing what rate of 
loading should be added to the rate of interest on loans. It is, 
however, difficult to determine and quantify their expectations. But
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since expectations can be assumed to be based on past actual inflation 
rates (with perhaps a time lag) these could be used as a proxy.
Foodgrain price data from 1959 to 1963 were used and their 
variances were obtained for each State and were ranked (Table 3.1). 
Foodgrain prices were used as an inflation indicator since in the rural 
areas foodgrains constitute a very high proportion of the total family 
expenditure. On theoretical grounds it may be anticipated that the 
higher the rate of inflation, the higher the rate of interest. In 
fact Spearman's co-efficient of rank correlation between the average 
rate of interest State-wise and the variance of foodgrain prices was 
+0.45^ which confirms the theoretical reasoning of a positive 
relationship between interest rates and inflation.
3 • 4 Rural Interest Rates in India:
On the basis of the above analysis, an attempt is made below 
to interpret the pattern of rates of interest in rural India. According 
to the All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey [58] cash loans 
borrowed at different rates >of interest in 1961-2 were as indicated in 
Table 3.2. below.
From the data of Table 3.2 the average rate of interest for 
India was calculated using the weighted arithmetic mean. This average 
rate was 11.71% per annum for 1961-2. Even given that the Bank Rate 
was around 4% in 1961, it seems likely that the survey has underestimated 
actual interest rates, especially if account is taken of the fact that 
institutional credit was only about 15% of the total and non-institutional
5 Significant at 5% level of significance.
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TABLE 3.2
ALL INDIA CASH 
DURING
LOANS BORROWED BY CULTIVATORS 
1961-2 CLASSIFIED BY RATES OF
FROM ALL 
INTEREST
SOURCES
Rate of Interest. (%) Percentage of amount Total amount borrowed
per annum borrowed to total (Rs in crores)
Nil 25.0 258.32
3 Vg or less 0.2 1.77
3 V8 to 6% 6.7 69.36
6h to 93/8 15.5 160.16
93/8 to 12% 18.7 193.07
12% to 18 Vf 8.1 84.07
183/4 to 25 16.5 170.95
25 to 37*2 4.9 50.37
Above 37^ 5 1.5 15.83
Unspecified 2.8 28.81
Not calculable 0.1
100.0
1.39
Source: All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey 1961-2 (Reserve
Bank of India) . (58)
sources which lend at high rates were the major source. This under­
estimation is probably due bo the fact that there are various types 
of loans for which interest is not specified explicitly. For example, 
loans which bind the borrower to sell his produce to the lender at a 
particular price may appear to be interest free, but may actually carry 
a high rate of interest, the level of which depends upon the difference 
between the selling price and the market rate. Another common method 
of obtaining loans is for borrowers (labourers in this case) to pledge 
their harvest wages. They subsequently sell the produce received as 
wages to repay the loan typically straight after harvest, when prices 
are low. Here, too, the rate of interest is not evident and may well
be very high.
53 .
To appreciate the complexities involved in determining rural 
interest rates it is necessary to be familiar with the different types 
of repayment obligations involved in rural loans in India. Broadly, 
these are:
(1) The loan and the repayment are in cash. This is the most 
straightforward arrangement and the rate of interest is easily 
calculable;
(2) The loan and the repayment are in terms of crop. Such loans 
are normally extended when crop prices are high while 
repayment is required immediately after harvest, when prices 
are low, and works to the advantage of the borrower. This 
arrangement renders interest rate calculations difficult;
(3) The loan is in terms of inputs (fertiliser, seeds, water) and 
repayment is from the harvested crop. This is quite a typical 
type of loan transaction between landlords and tenants. To 
compute the rate of interest it would be necessary to 
transform both loan and repayment into monetary terms.
However, this raises certain conceptual difficulties. The 
landlord may have 'purchased the inputs when prices were low 
but loans them when prices are high. Which price should be 
used for the transformation - the purchase price or that 
prevailing at the time when the loan was effected?
(4) The loan is in money terms and the repayment is in crop terms.
In certain cases, computation of interest is rendered extremely 
difficult by the fact that the borrower repays by entering 
into a usufructuary mortgage of fruit trees with the lender.
For the duration of the loan, the fruits of the trees, e.g.
mango, coconut etc. are enjoyed by the lender.
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(5) The cash or crop loan is repaid in terms of labour rendered 
either by the borrower or by a member of his household.
While a survey of 275 villages in Eastern India reported the
g
incidence of "bonded labour" to be insignificant [61] it did 
find a high incidence of indebtedness of the labourer to his 
employer. In a very large number of such cases where the 
labourer takes an advance (loan) from his employer, he works 
at a lower wage rate than the market wage rate during the time 
of repayment.
Thus in almost all kinds of credit relationships prevalent in
7rural India, the rate of interest is difficult to determine. Kurup's 
[62] analysis of a South Indian State revealed that nearly two-thirds 
of the loans do not explicitly specify a particular rate of interest - 
it is concealed and difficult to compute accurately. According to 
Rudra [54] loans from moneylenders usually carry an interest rate of 
between 10-20% per month or 120-240% per year. Long's [53] results 
show that on an average Indian farmers were paying an interest of 12.3% 
per annum for their credit in 1951-2 as opposed to the then prevailing 
Government bond rate of 3.4% per annum. A more recent assessment made 
by the World Bank [8] found the nominal or money rate of interest from
Bonded labour refers to the practice of a particular labourer or 
farm servant being tied to the creditor till the loan taken by the 
former is repaid. In certain areas it was not uncommon for the 
labourer to be in 'bondage' even after his death - the debt passed 
down to his children. The practice had been outlawed in most States 
by 1976.
In view of this in all probability, the actual rates of interest 
estimated by the All India Rural Credit Survey 1961-2 are under­
estimated. This does not, however, materially affect the earlier 
theoretical analysis regarding association between monopoly power etc. 
and the State wise rate of interest, if we make the not too unrealistic 
assumption that the underestimation of interest rates by the Survey 
was uniform for all the States.
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institutions to be 10%, and from others to be 25%. As the average rate 
of inflation was computed to be 10%, the real rate of interest was 
stated by the Bank to be 0% for institutional credit and 15% for non- 
institutional credit. A survey conducted by NCAER [42] for around the 
same period i.e. 1970-1 shows the average rates of interest on 
borrowings of different size groups from various sources as follows:
TABLE 3.3
AVERAGE RATES OF INTEREST ON BORROWINGS FOR VARIOUS FARM SIZE
CATEGORIES BY SOURCES
Size of Holdings 
(hectares) Govt. Coops Comm.
Banks
SOURCES
Money­
lenders
Friends
All
Sources
0-2 8.9 8.9 7.2 22.5 0 16.0
2-4 9.0 9.1 8.1 20.9 0 14.3
4-6 8.3 9.0 9.4 23.3 0 14.9
6 and above 8.4 9.0 9.2 16.3 0 9.0
All holdings 8.8 9.0 8.4 21.8 0 14.8
Source: NCAER: Credit Requirements for Agriculture. (42)
The average rate of interest for loans from institutions was 8.7%
(computed from Table 3.3) and from non-institutions was 21.8% making an 
overall average of 14.8%. These averages do not, however, reflect the 
rates that each category of borrowers have to pay since the quantum of 
loans issued by each source to each category is not the same. For 
instance, the percentage distribution of borrowings from moneylenders 
(Table 3.4) shows that borrowings from moneylenders who constitute the 
largest source of finance, is at different rates for different categories 
of farmers. Small farmers (with holdings from 0 to 2 hectares) obtained 
67.2% of their credit from moneylenders at over 18% interest while farmers
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with over 6 hectares had to pay over 18% for only 30.6% of their loans 
from moneylenders. This fits the general hypothesis of an inverse
TABLE 3.4
BORROWINGS FROM MONEYLENDERS BY SIZE GROUPS 
AT DIFFERENT RATES OF INTEREST (1970-1)
Rates of Interest 
(in percentages) 0-2
SIZE OF HOLDINGS 
2-4
(hectares)
4-6 Over 6
Up to 6 1.6 0.2 5.7 1.9
6-8 5.2 0.1 - -
8-10 4.2 3.1 3.3 2.4
10-12 14.8 18.8 2.4 36.3
12-15 5.0 11.3 2.1 2.5
15-18 2.0 3.6 25.0 26.3
18-24 67 ~(48.7 51.7 4°*6 30 (25.7Over 24 * (18.5 11.2 20.9 30 *6( 4.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NCAER: Credit Requirements for Agriculture.(42)
relationship between the size of the borrower and interest rates so that 
small farmers not only obtain a larger proportion of their loans from 
moneylenders, but acquire them at higher rates of interest. Thus 
although institutions charge more or less the same rates for different 
categories of farmers, small farmers pay an overall higher rate for 
their credit because a larger proportion of their loans come from non- 
institutional sources whose general rates are higher and who charge higher 
rates from small farmers.
Interest Rates for Small Farmer Lending:
A number of arguments are advanced for raising interest rates 
of agricultural loans in general and for small farmer loans in particular.
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It is contended that higher interest rates would not only enable lending 
institutions to be economically viable but would also help in mopping 
up rural savings. Potentially more funds would then become available 
for lending to small farmers. This is a tangential argument as it 
presupposes (a) that institutions are not viable because of low rates 
i.e. the rates do not cover the average costs of lending; (b) that an 
increase in rates will increase rural deposits and (c) that an increase 
in rural deposits will automatically result in a larger volume of 
lending in the rural sector, especially to the small farmers. The first 
assumption may well be valid for the low rates do not take account of 
high default rates. There is, however, little evidence to support the 
second presumption. In fact in India there was an increase in interest 
rates of agricultural credit socieites between 1951-2 and 1967-8, but deposits 
as a percentage of working capital declined from 9.7% to 6.3% in the same 
period [19]. On the other hand, evidence amply shows that despite a 
steady growth in the volume of deposits tapped by the commercial banks 
in rural areas,^ there has been no accompanying pari passu increase in 
their lending to the rural sector. The banks have been content with 
excess liquidity [65] and have been net exporters of capital from the 
rural sector [19]. Thus increased deposit mobilisation is not 
synonymous with increased lending in general nor does it ipso facto imply 
an increase in small farmer lending.
Another argument is that low interest rates which are designed 
ostensibly to help small farmers, actually assist the larger farmers 
since they receive the bulk of the credit [66] and these subsidised rates
8 The share of rural branches in total deposits of banks increased 
from 3.1% in June 1969 to 9.7% in December 1977.
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therefore result in income distribution becoming more skewed as the 
larger farmers receive more of the subsidy. This is linked with the 
"iron law of interest rate restrictions" [67] according to which the 
lower the rates, the less likely small farmers are to obtain credit 
as it would tend to become concentrated in a few hands. The implication 
is that at law rates, demand exceeds supply, and unless there is an 
effective rationing system, larger farmers because of their stronger 
economic and political influence, manage to secure the majority of it. 
Although superficially appealing, a closer examination of this argument 
reveals its speciousness. First, as indicated elsewhere, interest rates 
in the agricultural sector are not lower by comparison with the 
industrial sector. Second, the fact that larger farmers manage to obtain 
a proportionately larger quantum of credit is a criticism not of the 
intrinsic merits or demerits of the interest rate structure, but of the 
conception and implementation of institutional credit programmes. If, 
as argued, rates are designed to help small farmers but in effect do not, 
then surely something must be wrong with the disbursement system?
It is also contended that small farmers adopt new technology only 
if the expected rates of return are very high, so an increase in interest 
rates will not adversely affect farmers' profitability, and that in any 
case small farmers are used to the high interest rates of moneylenders 
[19]. This is a tenuous if not strange line of reasoning. There is 
little reason or merit in justifying high interest rates for small 
farmers on the grounds that they are accustomed to higher rates of 
moneylenders as one of the basic objectives of providing institutional 
credit is to make it available at cheaper rates. Besides, as is well 
known, farmers are generally risk averse as their "certainty equivalents" 
are less than their "expected money values" [68]. So to induce them to
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to adopt new and profitable technology, expected returns have to be 
greater than those from existing modes of production. It is also 
generally recognised that risk aversion is a decreasing function of 
wealth (size of holdings) so for a given technology, small farmers need 
a bigger inducement in terms of higher expected profits to coax them to 
adopt it. A higher interest rate would reduce the size of the expected 
profits and would deter a larger number of small farmers from adopting 
innovations.
It is affirmed that low rates imply underpricing of capital 
and so tend to encourage capital intensive techniques in labour surplus 
economies as the rates do not correctly reflect the scarcity of 
capital [47]. First, even if this is accepted as a valid postulate its 
validity would have to embrace the entire economy since the interest 
rates are not lower in agriculture than in industry. Second, it is 
relevant more for larger farmers than smaller ones since it is the
aformer who go in for capital intensive techniques e.g. tractorisation.
Perhaps the only substantial argument for higher rates of 
interest for small farmer lending is that the administrative costs of 
lending to them are greater and therefore they should be charged a 
higher rate. Although administrative costs of lending are not 
unvariable and can be reduced if suitable steps are taken, the fact 
remains that the costs per unit of loan do decline with increasing 
loan size. This, as will be discussed later, is a limiting factor 
if there is no "excess capacity" in the lending institutions. But 
against this there are a number of good and sufficient arguments for 
lower rates for small farmers.
a As indicated earlier, over 90% of institutional credit is short term 
crop loans and this percentage is higher for smaller farmers. Thus 
although there would be some adverse income distribution consequences, 
they are unlikely to be very serious.
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One peripheral argument offered to justify lower rates in 
agriculture in general and small farmers in particular is that the 
terms of trade have moved adversely for agriculture in relation to 
other sectors and therefore lower rates in agriculture would act as a 
stabilising and compensating factor. This urban bias in India has been 
indicated by Crawford [16] for the 1950s and by Lipton [69] for 
subsequent years. An analysis of the inter-sectoral terms of trade 
[70] does not however, support this hypothesis and in fact discloses 
that over the period the relative terms for agriculture moved favourably.
Even if, however, the urban bias theory is conceded, it is difficult to 
justify lower rates on that count alone. Justification merely on this 
ground reduces to using the credit mechanism for correcting distortions 
due to faulty pricing policies. Clearly, the "first best" solution would 
be to review and correct those pricing policies.
On equity grounds, a strong case for lower rates of interest 
for small farmer credit in India can be made out if account is taken of 
the fact that (a) the bulk of small farmer loans come from moneylenders 
at higher rates of interest, (b) there is a concealed subsidy in the 
provision of services like irrigation, electricity, extension, education 
etc. which have largely benefitted the bigger farmers and (c) the 
only tangible direct taxation of agriculture - land revenue - is in 
practice regressive, the incidence being greater on the smaller farmers [71].
On economic grounds too, it is contended here that if credit 
is based on considerations of higher marginal value product of variable capita 
on smaller farms, then there is much to be said in favour of adopting 
selective credit policies in favour of small farmers.
The persuasiveness of arguments for selective credit policies
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in favour of small farmers is greatly increased if due account is taken 
of the shift in emphasis in the basic goals of development towards 
income redistribution and achieving greater employment. Essentially, 
the aim of such selective credit policies is to channel a particular 
volume of credit to specific areas or segments of the population that 
are identified in the broad development goals as the "target areas or 
peoples. The instruments of such policies fall under two broad categories. 
The first set are policies that affect the supply of credit e.g. 
subsidies to lenders, differential reserve requirements etc. The second 
set are those that influence the demand for credit e.g. interest rate 
subsidies. We shall primarily be concerned with the latter and in the 
form most widely used, viz. differential rates of interest.
Theoretically, one can propose at least four situations in 
which there is an economic argument for differential rates of interest:
(1) Where the prevailing rate of interest is greater than the 
social rate of return [72].
(2) Where there is a divergence between the private and social 
rates of return of capital, with the social rate being greater 
than the private rate of return, but where credit institutions 
ignore social profitability so that the cost is considered
to be higher than the true social cost.
(3) Since loans are generally based on the credit-worthiness of 
the borrower with those financially strong being charged 
lower rates, the gap between social and private profitability 
is accentuated. This divergence can be attenuated by 
differential rates.
(4) Where as a matter of economic (and social) policy it is 
considered desirable to raise the standard of living of
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certain disadvantaged sections.
Thus the underlying basis of differential rates of interest 
stems from market imperfections which are due to the fragmentation of 
rural financial markets in developing countries like India and which 
therefore necessitate intervention. Proponents of laissez faire usually 
prefer a tax-cum-subsidy policy to differential rates of interest. This 
is based on the fear that while differential rates of interest would 
distort the capital market and so impose welfare costs [73], a Robin 
Hood policy of taxing the rich to subsidise the poor would not suffer 
from such a debility. The point would be well taken if the credit 
markets were perfect to start with, but since imperfection and 
inefficiency are the characteristic features of such markets in India, 
the criticism is purely academic. Moreover, a tax-cum-subsidy policy 
though theoretically attractive, loses on the grounds of higher 
administrative expense and impracticality of implementation.
In the widely variable economic milieu prevailing in India, 
till recently selectiveness in credit was sought through directives 
issued by the Reserve Bank of India to State Cooperative Banks to ensure 
that not less than 20% of the short-term advances during the year went to 
small/marginal farmers. The All India Rural Credit Review Committee [19] 
which recognised the problem of inadequacy of credit for small farmers, 
suggested selectivity of credit policies based on a graded scale of 
finance for different categories of farmers. The suggestion was that 
small farmers be granted loans up to the full entitlement worked on the 
basis of scales of finance and acreage, while for medium farmers 
(between 5-10 acres) the maximum may be limited to 75% of their 
entitlement and for large farmers, to 50% of the entitlement. The
suggestion was not implemented in full. Under the "Small Farmers Window
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scheme introduced in January 1978 individual loans up to Rs 2500 by 
commercial banks to small farmers are eligible for refinance from the 
Reserve Bank of India at a lower rate of interest and the banks in turn 
are required to charge a lower rate from small farmers.
A selective credit instrument which has been in existence for
some time is the Differential Rate of Interest (DRI) scheme. It was
introduced in 1972 with the objective of catering for the credit needs
of small farmers and other weaker sections. Under the scheme, eligible
categories of borrowers are provided loans by commercial banks at 4%
9rate of interest. Eligibility is restricted to those whose income does 
not exceed Rs 2000 per annum in rural areas (Rs 3000 in urban areas) 
and the size of the holding does not exceed 2.5 acres of unirrigated land 
or 1 acre of irrigated land. Generally, the maximum quantum of the 
loan is Rs 1500 for short-term and Rs 5000 for term loans. In order 
to ensure that funds actually flow to the small farmers etc., it has 
been stipulated that commercial banks will lend a minimum of 0.5%'*’^ 
of their aggregate advances in the previous year, under the scheme.
To ensure that people in the rural areas derive the maximum benefit 
from the scheme and that the bulk of the advances are not pre-empted 
by urban areas, it is incumbent on the banks to route at least two-thirds 
of their advances through their rural branches. The progress under the 
scheme is shown in Table 3.5 below.
Although the overall progress has been satisfactory in the 
sense that the minimum stipulated percentage of advances has been
The Bank Rate in 1972 was 6%, but has now increased to 9%, so that 
the differential has gone up from 2% to 5%.
10 This was increased to 1% in November 1978.
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TABLE 3.5
PROGRESS UNDER THE DIFFERENTIAL RATE OF INTEREST SCHEME
Year Percentage of DRI advances to total advances
1972 0.02
1973 0.22
1974 0.23
1975 0.31
1976 0.56
1977 0.60
1978 0.58* (*estimated)
Source: Government of India: Report of the Working Group of
Differential Rate of Interest Scheme (October 1978). (88)
achieved> in terms of overall impact in extending credit to small farmers, 
the scheme has at best, barely scratched the surface. - Ln 1971 commercial 
banks accounted for only 2.4% of the total credit supplied in the rural 
sector, so the DRI scheme covers at best 0.5% of 2.4% or an insignificant 
0.012% of the total supply.
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CHAPTER 4
FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT 
4.1 Indicators of Success
The analysis in Chapter 2 of the supply of credit utilised 
aggregate country-wide data which conceals much inter-State variation 
in credit supply and in the performance of credit institutions. An 
investigation of inter-State variations is apposite not merely because 
it facilitates a fuller understanding of the issue but also because such 
an examination will enable analysis of the reasons for the variations.
The latter, in turn has a bearing on factors that affect the performance 
of institutional credit agencies.
It is argued here that a successful credit institution is one 
which (a) is economically sustainable and in which repayment is efficient. 
Sustainability implies that the institution is capable of generating 
its own funds by raising depositis. The relevance of repayment 
efficiency is obvious for if the repayment record is unsatisfactory, the 
institution's relending ability will be severely impaired; (b) has a 
wide coverage in terms of cultivators and area; and (c) makes credit 
available to those previously excluded. This is a measure of the dynamism 
of the institution since one of the objectives of any credit programme 
is to reach out to new clients.
Indicators of these elements of success may be taken to be 
(i) the level of deposits per member and (ii) the arrear rate or 
the overdues: demand ratio, for the first component, (iii) Ratio of
members to total cultivators; (iv) percentage of borrowing members to 
total cultivator households and (v) the per hectare loan amount.
These three indicators portray the second element. (vi) The percentage 
variation (increas or decrease) in the number of borrowing members
between any two or more specified time periods could
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be adopted as an index of the third element.
4.2 Ranking of States
Using these indicators, the various States'^  in India have been 
ranked according to their performance with respect to each indicator 
(Table 4.1) for PACS credit. If weights are allotted to each indicator, 
then it would be possible to get a combined rank which would depict the 
relative success of PACS in the various States. The final rank (col. 8, 
Table 4.1) has been calculated by allotting equal weights to each 
indicator.
A similar exercise can be done for the performance of 
commercial banks in various states. Quite obviously indices such as 
membership per cultivator, or percentage of borrowing members to 
total cultivator households are not relevant for commercial banks.
Those chosen to guage the performance of commercial banks in various 
States are (i) the per hectare loan amount and (ii) the level of 
oustanding loans per hectare. Using these indices the various States 
have been ranked (Table 4.2) and by giving equal weight to each of 
these indices, a combined final rank has been computed (col. 4, Table 4.2).
A comparison of the final ranking of States with respect to 
PACS credit and the final rank with regard to commercial bank credit 
would tend to suggest that commercial bank credit has gone largely to 
those States which are relatively better served by cooperative credit.
In fact Spearman's co-efficient of rank correlation between the two 
final ranks works out to a very high +0.77. The co-efficient between
Only the 17 major States have been taken into consideration. The 
Union Territories and the five hill States of Nagaland, Sikkim, 
Manipur, Meghalaya and Tirpura have been excluded as they were 
constituted recently and are small in terms of population.
Source: 
Computations based on data from RBI, Statistical Statements Relating to the Cooperative Movement in India
(Pt. 1, Credit Societies). 
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TABLE 4.2
RANKING OF VARIOUS STATES IN TERMS OF 
COMMERCIAL BANK AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
Rank Per Hectare Loan 1975-6
Per Hectare Outstanding 
(June 1976)
Combined 
Final Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Kerala Kerala Kerala
2 Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu
3 Karnataka Karnataka Karnataka
4 Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh
5 Punjab Punjab Punjab
6 Haryana Haryana Haryana
7 Gujrat Maharashtra Gujrat
8 Maharashtra Gujrat Maharashtra (7)
9 Himachal Pradesh West Bengal Himachal Pradesh
10 Uttar Pradesh Himachal Pradesh West Bengal
11 West Bengal Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh
12 Bihar Bihar Bihar
13 Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
14 Orissa Rajasthan Rajasthan
15 Rajasthan Orissa Orissa (14)
16 Jammu & Kashmir Jammu & Kashmir Jammu & Kashmir
17 Assam Assam Assam
Source: Dantwata Committee.(50)
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the per hectare loan amount of cooperative credit and the per hectare 
loan amount of commercial bank credit is even higher, being +0.88. This 
supports the conclusion that commercial banks' performance in lending to 
agriculture has been relatively better precisely in those areas where 
the cooperative structure has been stronger.
This has three ramifications. First,it suggests that one of the 
effects of the expansion of commercial bank credit has been to widen 
inter-regional disparities in terms of credit availability already 
evident in relation to cooperative credit. Second, it belies the 
Government's hope that commercial banks would provide credit especially 
in those areas not covered adequately by cooperatives so that there 
would be complementarity rather than competition between the two types 
of institutions. Third, it supports the view that whatever conclusions 
are derived for the success of cooperative credit could ipso facto be
extended to commercial bank credit.
4.3 Analysis of Factors
In the light of the above analysis an important question is 
why cooperatives and commercial banks have performed better in some 
States and not in others.. I.t is generally believed that cooperatives 
have worked best in areas where literacy is high, where landholdings 
are homogeneous and where land reforms have been carried out [8]. To 
these could be added certain other factors which generally aid adoption 
of new technology and thereby assist in the modernisation of agriculture 
viz. irrigation, fertiliser usage and electrification.
4.3.1 Literacy:
The role of literacy or formal education in economic development 
in general and agricultural development in particular has been widely
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recognised. The innovative, allocative, worker and external effects of 
formal education have been highlighted [26, 27] to the extent that the 
view is held that formal education in terms of literacy and school 
enrollment ratios explain about one third of the difference in agricultural 
productivity between U.S.A. and India and nearly one half of that 
between Japan and India [7]. While it is not appropriate here to discuss 
the merits of this proposition, it could be intuitively argued that the 
development of cooperation itself is a function of education. In fact 
Chaudhri's study [74] of the States of Punjab and Haryana indicates 
that secondary education of cultivators has a positive influence on 
membership of cooperative societies. A positive correlation between 
literacy and performance of States in terms of cooperative credit may 
be anticipated. In fact Spearman's co-efficient of rank correlation (r1) 
between them is +0.622 indicating a positive and high degree of 
association between credit and literacy (Table 4.3).
4.3.2 Land Reforms:
Non-economic factors like land reforms have been emphasised 
[28] as an important variable in development. Land reforms encompass 
a host of agrarian relationships from the mechanics of tenant-landlord 
relationship to ceilings on agricultural land and consolidation of 
holdings. Access to credit either through the existence of well developed 
institutional sources or satisfactory channels of off farm remittances 
tends to mitigate the stifling limitations of an inequitable agrarian 
structure [29]. On the other hand, the implementation of land reforms 
provides an economic incentive to the cultivators to adopt better
2 This value of r' is significant at 5% level of significance.
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t e c h n i q u e s  and new p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o lo g y  w hich in  t u r n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e i r  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  c r e d i t .  Assuming t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  r e q u i r e m e n ts  a re  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  b e t t e r  s u p p ly ,  a  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  be tw een  th e  
p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  S t a t e s  r a n k e d  a c c o r d in g  t o  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  l a n d  re fo rm s  
and  t h e i r  p e r fo rm a n c e  in  c o o p e r a t i v e  c r e d i t  may be e x p e c t e d .
A lth o u g h  te n a n c y  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  a  good i n d i c a t o r  o f  la n d
r e f o r m s ,  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  th e m s e lv e s  c a n n o t  be q u a n i t i f i e d ,  and even
t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t e n a n c y  i s  f r a u g h t  w i th  c o m p u ta t io n a l  
3
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  p r i m a r i l y  b e c a u s e  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by an
e x c e s s i v e  demand f o r  l a n d ,  t e n a n c y  a g re e m e n ts  a re  se ldom  r e c o r d e d .
S t a t i s t i c s  r e l a t i n g  t o  p r o g r e s s  i n  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  h o l d i n g s ,  w hich a r e
more a c c u r a t e ,  have t h e r e f o r e  been  u se d  (T ab le  4 . 3 ) .  S p e a rm a n 's
c o - e f f i c i e n t  o f  ran k  c o r r e l a t i o n  be tw een  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  h o l d in g s  p e r
n e t  c ro p p e d  a r e a  and p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  c r e d i t  y i e l d s  a
4
c o - e f f i c i e n t  o f  +0 .70  w hich shows t h a t  S t a t e s  where c o o p e r a t i v e  c r e d i t  
h a s  been  s u c c e s s f u l  a r e  a l s o  S t a t e s  where l a n d  re fo rm s  ( c o n s o l i d a t i o n  
o f  h o l d in g s )  have  been  im p lem e n te d .
4 . 3 . 3  I r r i g a t i o n :
A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a s s u r e d  i r r i g a t i o n  c o u ld  be e x p e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e
For i n s t a n c e ,  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Census o f  1971, t h e  
p e r c e n ta g e  o f  l e a s e d  in  a r e a  t o  t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  a r e a  was 4.8% f o r  
t h e  e n t i r e  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  such  l e a s i n g  v a r y in g  from 30% 
in  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Jammu and Kashmir t o  0.3% in  B i h a r .  The N a t io n a l  
Sample Survey  on th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  e s t i m a t e d  t h e  a l l - I n d i a  f i g u r e  
to  be 10.6%, w i th  t h e  r e l e v a n t  f i g u r e s  f o r  Jammu and Kashm ir b e in g  
8% and f o r  B ih a r  14.5%! A p a r t  from th e  wide d i s c r e p a n c y ,  i t  i s  
l i k e l y  t h a t  b o th  s e t s  o f  f i g u r e s  a r e  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s .
S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5% l e v e l .
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the requirements of credit by making it technically feasible to 
undertake double or multiple cropping and by enabling adoption of 
better varieties such as the High Yielding Varieties (HYV). Since 
HYVs in order to be economically attractive require substantial 
irrigation in conjunction with other inputs, an improvement in irrigation 
facilities would reduce the risks associated with their adoption and at 
the same time increase the requirement for credit to meet the cost of 
increased use of other inputs. Moreover, the very provision of irrigation 
(private) entails a large capital outlay and therefore a larger requirement 
of credit if savings are inadequate. Theoretically therefore, the 
incidence of irrigation should tend to be positively correlated with 
the incidence of successful cooperative credit. In fact Spearman's 
co-efficient of rank correlation between gross irrigated area as a 
percentage of gross cropped area (Table 4.3) and States ranked according 
to success of cooperative credit is +0.36.
This low co-efficient is perhaps due to the fact that the 
irrigation variable "gross irrigated area as a percentage of gross 
cropped area" is inclusive of all sources of irrigation, and so covers 
the preponderant Government sources. As is well known, Government 
irrigation sources in the country were, and to a large extent still 
are, protective rather than intensive, and therefore this variable 
fails to capture the full effects of irrigation, as for example, well 
irrigation with its greater degree of control over water is likely to 
do. In fact if ranking of States by gross irrigated area as a percentage 
of gross cropped area is combined with the ranking of States according 
to area irrigated by wells as a percentage of area irrigated by other 
sources (Table 4.3, col. 5) and this combined rank correlated with 
performance of cooperative credit, then the value of the co-efficient
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increases to +0.6, which is significant at 5% level of significance.
4.3.4 Consumption of Chemical Fertilisers:
Use of chemical fertilisers is to a large extent facilitated 
by the availability of irrigation. Since the incidence of irrigation 
itself is associated with successful cooperative credit, on this ground 
alone it may be anticipated that States with high fertiliser consumption 
would be States where cooperative credit is relatively successful.
Apart from the association between cooperative credit and irrigation is 
the fact that short term loans extended by cooperatives usually have a 
cash and a kind component and the kind component is generally in the form 
of fertilisers. This would tend to strengthen the expectation of a high 
degree of association between consumption of fertilisers and cooperative 
credit. Spearman's co-efficient of rank correlation between State-wise 
consumption of all chemical fertilisers per unit of gross cropped area 
and successful cooperative credit is computed to be +0.58 which confirms 
the a priori reasoning as the value of r' is significant at 5% level of 
significance.
4.3.5 Rural Electrification:
Rural electrification affects the requirements of agricultural 
credit indirectly. One indirect effect is through irrigation. 
Electrification facilitates energisation of irrigation wells and the 
prospect of being able to do so serves as an encouragement to farmers 
to invest in well irrigation. The positive association between well 
irrigation and successful cooperative credit has already been referred
to earlier. In addition, rural electrification would increase the
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expenditure on excavation and energisation of wells and thereby enhance 
the requirement for credit still further. Other indirect effects not 
generally perceived relate to the role of electrification in dissemination 
of new technology through radio/television. Even the extension staff 
charged with the responsibility of visiting villages and educating 
farmers in better practices tend to choose those which are electrified. 
These visits are conducive to encouraging the farmers willingness and 
influencing their decision to adopt better practices, but to be able to 
do so, they require credit. For these reasons, a positive association 
between rural electrification and successful cooperative credit in the 
various States may be anticipated - in fact the co-efficient of rank 
correlation between the two is +0.78 which is significant at 5% level 
of significance.
4.3.6 Cooperative Marketing;
An interesting feature of the cooperative credit system has 
been the attempted linkage between credit and marketing societies.
As a result of the recommendations of the All India Rural Credit Survey 
1951-2 [23] , cooperative marketing was promoted seriously from the Second 
Five Year Plan (1956) onwards though its origins can be traced back to 
the Cooperative Societies Act 1912 which indicated non-credit forms of 
cooperation, including marketing.
Theoretically, cooperative marketing is intended to help 
break the "credit connection" of the moneylenders by attracting farmers 
away from them, especially small farmers who lean heavily on moneylenders 
for credit and have been morally or contractually bound to sell their 
produce to them at prices that are often low. The private trader-cum- 
moneylender in turn, by treating his credit and marketing functions as a
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composite whole is able to increase his stranglehold on the farmers.
By granting loans at high interest rates, the moneylender more than 
covers his cost so that in the face of competition from cooperative 
marketing it is easy for him to lower his margin, and if necessary, 
suffer a temporary loss from marketing, secure in the knowledge that this 
will be adequately covered by profit from credit arrangements. It was a 
realisation of this intricate relationship which prompted the Rural Credit 
Survey [23] to suggest that all credit societies should be affiliated 
to marketing societies so that the crop loans advanced by the former 
would be recovered by the latter. It was thought that this linkage 
between the two would help the credit societies in recovery of loans and 
the marketing societies in enhancing the volume of their business. In 
fact in some States, e.g. Andhra Pradesh, farmers were tempted by the 
prospect of loans on a liberal scale if they undertook to market their 
production through the marketing societies, while in some others, e.g. 
Punjab, the carrot was in the form of lower interest rates if the farmers 
repayed through the marketing societies [85].
Because of this linkage and the inducements offered, one may 
expect States with successful cooperative credit structure to be also 
States where cooperative marketing has made better headway.
In Table 4.4 (col. 2) the States in India have been ranked 
according to the value of agricultural produce purchased per primary 
cooperative marketing society. Purchase of agricultural produce is the 
single most important function of marketing societies as by doing so 
the farmers are assured of a better price since the societies by virtue 
of their better holding capacity are able to save the farmers, 
especially the smaller ones, from forced post-harvest distress sales.
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This would tend to increase the incentive to adopt higher cost new 
technology and increase the demand for institutional credit. Spearman's 
co-efficient of rank correlation between States ranked according to 
cooperative credit performance (Table 4.1) and ranking of States according 
to purchases of agricultural produce by cooperative marketing societies 
yields a co-efficient of +0.50 which shows that successful cooperative 
credit and cooperative marketing go hand in hand.
Purchase of agricultural produce, although a fundamental 
function, is only one of the activities of cooperative marketing societies 
Hence a more accurate barometer of their performance would be to consider 
their other crucial marketing and distribution operations e.g. sales of 
agricultural produce and sales of agricultural requisites (cols. 3 and 4 
respectively in Table 4.4). Taking into account all these marketing 
and distribution operations, the States can be ranked according to their 
combined performance in terms of cooperative marketing (col. 5, Table 4.4) 
As this is a better reflection of the performance of cooperative 
marketing, the anticipation is that Spearman's co-efficient of rank 
correlation between this and cooperative credit performance of States 
would be higher than that previously obtained. The co-efficient is 
computed to be +0.69^ highlighting once again the close positive
association between cooperative credit and cooperative marketing.
4.4 Implications of Association
From the preceding paragraphs it is seen that successful
cooperative credit is positively and highly correlated with literacy, 
land reforms, irrigation etc. It is necessary, however, to enter a 
caveat here. A high correlation co-efficient does not necessarily imply
5 Significant at 5% level of significance.
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any functional relationship between the variables under study, just as 
a zero co-efficient does not necessarily imply statistical independence 
[30, 31]. Correlation theory does not establish or prove any causal 
relationship and a high correlation co-efficient may be indicative of 
simple causation or two-way causation, or influence of external factors 
or even mere coincidence.
It would therefore be pernicious to conclude that literacy, 
land reforms etc. are the factors responsible for the better performance 
of cooperative credit in certain States. Land reforms etc. may be a 
lead or a lag variable or a lead and a lag variable in the causation 
chain. In the absence of evidence to establish a more precise relation­
ship between the various inter-related variables which influence 
functioning of credit institutions, a more pragmatic approach would be 
to view the statistical co-efficients in conjunction with the theoretical 
analysis and at best draw conditional conclusions. Undoubtedly, this is 
an area where there is great scope for a more probing analysis with the 
help of detailed time series and cross-sectional data.
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CHAPTER 5
SMALL FARMER CREDIT
5.1 Primacy
The primacy of the need for small farmer credit in India stems 
from three sources. The first and overwhelming source is the sheer 
numbers. According to the Agricultural Census of 1970-71, out of 70.5 
million operational holdings in the country, almost 50 million or 70% 
were below 2 hectares (20). The second relates to productivity.
Despite the arguments to the contrary by some (36, 37) it is generally 
recognised that there is an inverse relationship between holding size 
and productivity (32, 33, 34, 35) which has far reaching implications 
for optimality in allocation of resources, including credit. Large 
farms usually produce more per unit of labour than the smaller ones but 
the latter produce more per unit of land. But since land is the scarce 
resource (the physical limit of expansion of the land frontier having 
been reached in the 1950s) is is obvious that concentration of develop­
mental efforts on small farms will not only yield better results in 
terms of production, but also result in a more intensive utilisation of 
the country's relatively abundant factor - labour. Third, even if the 
inverse size-productivity relationship was not an observed or accepted 
phenomenon, the issues involving small farmer credit would still be of 
considerable importance in relation to the global shift in the meaning 
and strategies of rural development in the 1970s. The large majority 
of rural poor in India comprise marginal farmers with less than 0.5 
hectares of land and small farmers with holdings between 0.5 to 2 hectares.
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These constitute the 'target group' and any programmes for development 
to be even mildly successful and self-sustaining must be directed at 
them.
Before we examine issues connected with small farmer credit in 
India, it is useful to be clear as to the definition of a small farmer. 
Physical size of holdings, income, output, investment, marketed surplus, 
ratio of family to hired labour are criteria often employed to categorise 
small farmers. Without examining their relative merits, it should be 
noted that while a particular criterion may be appropriate for one 
specific purpose it may be inept for others, e.g. size criterion may fit 
a policy prescription for redistribution of surplus land, while income 
may be more apt if the consideration is whether to exempt a certain 
category of farmers from a proposed agricultural income tax.
From a credit standpoint, a distinction can be drawn between 
the following categories of small farmers: (i) those who are economically
viable'*' and have easy access to institutional credit (ii) those whose 
farms are potentially viable if given access to technology, inputs, 
markets, credit etc. (iii) those whose farms are potentially viable but 
need special treatment, e.g. subsidies for a certain length of time 
(iv) those with such poor resource endowments that they would not be 
viable without a permanent subsidy, e.g. marginal farmers who become 
financially self-supporting only if their farm income is supplemented 
by income from other subsidiary occupations.
1 Viability has a wide range of possible connotations. Here it is 
used to refer to farmers whose income is adequate to meet the needs 
of the household and farm enterprise.
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The above demarcation reconciles the apparently contradictory 
propositions sometimes offered in relation to small farmer credit. For 
instance at one end of the spectrum are conclusions such as 'if a new 
technology requiring small seasonal outlays - such as a high yielding 
variety in an irrigated area - is not being accepted by small farmers, 
the explanation probably involves profits and risks and not the lack of 
credit.1 (38). The implied assumption is that if market signals are
strong and technology divisible, most small farmers are able to and do 
in fact invest their own resources. This is a valid proposition only 
if the reference is to small farmers in the first category. At the other 
end of the continuum, the lament is that it is the lack of credit that 
generally preempts small farmers from taking advantage of the technolog­
ical innovations (39) and hinders the rate of progress of the 'Green 
Revolution'. This line of reasoning too is well-founded only if the
allusion is to small farmers other than in the first category.
5.2 Inadequacy of Credit
Within the above conceptual framework, an analysis of the
requirements and supply of small farmer credit is very revealing. The
inappropriateness of a single measure of size has already been indicated,
but unless specifically indicated we will follow the normal Govt, practice
of defining small farmers in terms of size of holding and lump together
2all those with less than 2 hectares as small farmers. The All India 
Debt and Investment Surveys of 1961-62 and 1971-72 classified cultivators 
according to their assets.
2 It is realised of course that 2 hectares in the fertile Gangetic 
plain is an entirely different proposition from 2 hectares in the 
semi-arid regions of north western India.
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Data for 1961-62 (Table 5.1) shows that the ratio of average 
borrowing/outstanding of small farmers were less than that of the large 
farmers. It could be argued that this was so precisely because they
were small in terms of overall acreage. The fact that the area cultiv­
ated by them constituted only about 23% of the total might lead one to
the conclusion that they were in no way being disadvantaged vis-a-vis
3large farmers in terms of credit availability. This however, can be 
rejected for the following reasons. First, big cultivators command 
larger resources of their own and so their dependance on credit is less. 
Second, small farms have generally been found to be more intensively
4cultivated so their per acre requirement of credit would be greater.
Third, as Table 5.1 shows, average borrowing per acre of small farmers 
from co-operatives is about half that of larger farmers. This is 
significant since as discussed earlier, institutional sources provided 
only 18.7% of the credit requirements and of this, co-operatives pro­
vided the lions share (15.5%). It is significant because it demonstrates 
that a larger chunk of even the meagre quantum of credit obtained by 
small farmers was at a higher cost since it is well established that the 
rate of interest charged by non institutional sources is much higher.
3 This conclusion can be derived from Table 5.1. Assuming that those 
asset groups up to Rs2500-5000 represent small and marginal farmers, 
their percentage outstanding to total was 22.3. Similarly, their 
percentage borrowing to total was 21.2. These compare favourably 
with the percentage of the total area cultivated by that group which 
was 23.
4 It could be argued that the intensity of cultivation of small farms 
is with reference to own labour only. While this is conceded, it 
cannot be denied that to increase productivity per acre, labour has 
to be combined with the use of other inputs and this requires capital.
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TABLE 5.1
AVERAGE BORROWINGS AND OUTSTANDINGS OF 
CULTIVATORS 1961-62 
(per household in Rs)
Asset Group (Rs) Average
Outstanding (Rs) 
(1)
Average 
Borrowing (Rs)
(2)
Average Borrowing 
Per Acre From 
Co-ops 
(3)
Less than 500 127 45 1.81
500 - 1000 171 70 2.38
1000 - 2500 240 98 2.81
2500 - 5000 365 156 3.66
5000 -10000 539 251 4.42
10000 -20000 844 386 5.36
20000 & above 1763 737 7.33
All Groups 473 205 4.81
Source; All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey - 1961-62.(58)
A number of steps were introduced to improve availability of 
credit to small farmers, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
However, progress has been marginal. The NCAER study for 1970-71 
(Table 5.2) shows that small farmers obtained only 21% of their credit 
requirements from institutional sources and resorted for 66% of their 
needs to high cost moneylenders. The largest farmers who could afford 
to pay more, obtained only 24% of their loans from moneylenders.
Other evidence from the same study reinforces the argument 
(Table 5.3). Only 22.5% of small farmers were able to borrow from 
co-operatives and fared no better even from the Govt, which notionally
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TABLE 5.2
BORROWINGS FROM INSTITUTIONS AND NON INSTITUTIONS ACCORDING 
TO SIZE OF HOLDINGS : 1970-71 
(in percentages)
Source Below 2 Hect. 2-4 Hect. 4-6 Hect. 6 and above
Institutional 21.4 34.8 37.4 32.3
Non institutional 77.2 65.2 62.6 67.7
Moneylenders etc. 66.2 59.6 54.9 23.6
Source: NCAER (42)
TABLE 5.3
PERCENTAGE OF BORROWERS OBTAINING CREDIT
BY SOURCE : 1970-71
Size of 
Holdings 
(Hectares)
Govt,. Co-ops C.Banks Moneylenders
Friends
and
Relatives
rvjio 12.1 22.5 1.0 77.0 13.6
2 - 4 21.5 33.9 3.2 68.3 8.7
4 - 6 7.9 59.1 6.3 66.1 5.7
Over 6 7.6 40.0 5.3 40.8 32.9
Source: NCAER : Credit Requirements for Agriculture. (42)
is meant for them. More recent statistics of 1975-76 relating to loans 
and advances of primary agricultural credit societies showed that only 
29.6% of the loans of these societies went to small farmers (40). Thus 
despite a number of measures taken in the recent years, the broad
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conclusion of the All India Rural Review Committee reached in 1969 that 
'the small farmers are handicapped in the matter of access to credit'
(19), is as valid in the late 1970s as it was then. In fairness,
however, it should be pointed out that in some States (e.g. Maharashtra) 
where the co-operative structure has had a firm foundation, it has been 
lately observed that small farmers received more than their due share 
in comparison with medium and large owners (41). But even in these 
States it has been recognised that the extent of their membership in
co-operatives is much less than that of medium and large farmers.
5.3 Reasons for Inadequacy
A pertinent question at this point is why do existing institutions 
lend so little to the small farmers. A number of factors both on the 
supply and demand sides have contributed to this. On the supply side, 
it reflects small farmers general lack of 'creditworthiness' as per­
ceived by the lender. Despite guidelines to the effect that loans 
should be based not on the principle of 'creditworthiness of the borrower' 
but on the 'creditworthiness of the proposal' commercial banks and co­
operatives still follow the former maxim especially in the case of term 
loans. There is thus a more than warranted degree of security con­
sciousness amongst lenders which works to the detriment of the small 
farmers. Insistence on collateral penalises the small farmer who is 
progressive and capable of repaying loans from increased production. 
Reliance on possible liquidation of pledged collateral to recover loans 
(rather than on an analysis of the borrower's ability to repay from the 
incremental income)apart from being an anachronistic practice which 
incidently does little to lift the image of the calibre of management 
of these institutions, is in reality a chimerical 'advantage'.
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The extra security that institutions imagine this gives them 
is illusory. Although data for the entire country is lacking on this, 
statistics from six primary agricultural societies in two districts of 
Andhra Pradesh show that despite the usual quota of defaults, not a 
single farmer, big or small, was dispossessed to recover outstanding 
dues despite large overdues. Even the Credit Review Committee had
observed a decade ago.... 'the significance of the security of land
is not so much that it can be realised....' (19). Thus the insurance
value of land as collateral on which so much reliance is placed by 
institutions is doubtful.
According to the Credit Review Committee, the most important 
reason for the relative neglect of small farmers is 'prejudice and 
indifference towards the small man' (19) by the management of co-operative 
institutions which is in the hands of larger farmers right from the grass 
roots level. This not only results in small farmer interests being 
inadequately represented but in effect makes a mockery of the principle 
of open membership of co-operatives. It is not surprising therefore 
to find that only 16.6% of small farmers were members of agricultural 
co-operatives in 1970-71 (42). Although in the Co-operatives Societies 
Act there is a provision for appeal to the RCS or his nominee if a farmer 
on proper application is not admitted as a member, the societies tend 
to circumvent this provision by not formally rejecting the application 
but keeping it pending indefinitely. Some States (notably Andhra 
Pradesh) have got around these filibustering tactics by stipulating that 
unless a decision to the contrary is communicated to the applicant 
within 60 days, he is deemed to have become a member. Mere membership,
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though an important first step, does not, however, imply that the 
loan sought would be granted.
Even if the farmer is admitted as a member insistence on a 
high ratio of share capital to credit by co-operatives (generally 
between 1:8 to 1:10) often prevents small farmers from taking advantage 
of credit facilities for lack of the required share capital to become 
eligible for the loan required. A simple example will illustrate how 
this acts as a handicap. Assume that a small farmer has 3 acres of 
land and requires a crop loan of Rs. 500 per acre. For the total 
loan of Rs. 1500, he will require to contribute Rs. 150 towards the 
share capital at a time when his resources are particularly scarce.
It should be pointed out, however, that recently there have been relax­
ations of this and for small farmers the share ratio has been
lowered to 1:20.
Juxtaposed to this problem is the question of valuation of 
land. For long term loans, land development and commercial banks insist 
on hypothecation of land as security. But the valuation of land for 
this purpose is typically depressed as it is based on sales statistics 
which, for a variety of reasons, seldom reflect true values. This is 
compounded by the fact that the maximum loan admissible is limited to 
50% of the value of the security for long term loans (43). The restrict­
ion imposed by these practices can be gauged from an example of a 
hypothetical farmer with 3 acres of land. If the price per acre is 
Rs. 5000, the market valuation of his land is Rs. 15,000. But according
to sales statistics the valuation may be only Rs. 3000 per acre or Rs. 9000
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in all (a reduction of 40% which is not unusually high). The maximum 
loan entitlement of the farmer would be 50% of Rs. 9000 or Rs. 4500.
So if he applies for a loan of Rs. 2500 to excavate an irrigation well 
and requires another Rs. 3000 for a pumpset to energise it he will 
find that he can either have the well or the pumpset, not both, despite 
having landed property worth Rs. 15,000. This results in under­
financing of small farmers which in turn leads to a waste of resources 
since inadequate credit does not lead to the expected incremental income 
generation.
Another factor which tends to dissuade institutions from 
lending to small farmers relates to the fear that small farmers have very 
little margin for failure, i.e. the gap between income and expenditure 
is very small so even a minor contingency can upset the production plans 
and create problems of repayment. However, a number of studies have 
shown that this apprehension is ill-founded. Default rates depend on 
a number of factors. The inverse relationship between the size of the 
gross income of the borrower and default is valid only under the assump­
tion that the borrower tries to repay the loan or in Bessel's (44) 
terminology, the social risk, which reflects lack of desire to repay, 
is zero. In other words, the ability to repay is matched by the 
willingness to repay. That this assumption does not hold good in a 
number of developing countries and that it is the big farmers whose 
default to loan ratio is highest has been well documented (45, 39). In 
fact the country papers presented at the AID Spring Review of Small 
Farmers credit suggest 'that for programs with relatively good repayment 
records in particular, but also as a general rule, small farmers have
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not been more delinquent than the larger farmers and often have been 
less delinquent'. (47). In India, evidence is not uniform. Some 
studies (46) show that the major defaults on co-operative credit were 
by the larger farmers. This is especially true in areas where the 
repayment performance in the co-operatives had been particularly un­
satisfactory. Moreover, there is, what may be described as a 'vicious 
circle of overdues'. Institutions hesitate in lending adequately to 
small farmers for fear that they may not be able to repay. The in­
adequate loan forces the farmers to seek higher cost loans from money­
lenders to make up the balance of their requirements. Since loans 
from moneylenders carry a higher rate of interest and the farmers know 
that they will have to rely on this source in times of urgent need, 
they prefer to repay the moneylenders dues first and default on co­
operative loans and substantiate the fears. Small wonder then that a 
study conducted by the Reserve Bank of India in one of the districts in 
Andhra Pradesh found that one of the major causes of co-operative over- 
dues was the preference shown by members to repay the loans from non 
institutional sources (19).
Another reason for the low volume of lending to small farmers 
has been attributed to the higher administrative costs involved in 
making a large number of small loans as opposed to a small number of 
large loans. Linked to this is the fact that evaluation of credit 
programmes in the past have tended to be a mere financial accounting 
exercise of loan delivery and loan repayment and it is easier and 
quicker to deliver large amounts of loans to a relatively smaller number 
of large farmers. Much has been made of higher administrative costs
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in recent economic literature to explain away low volume of lending 
to small farmers but this should not be accepted unquestioningly for 
closer scrutiny reveals that it is not always a limiting factor.
While it is true that short term loans are fixed with reference to 
the crop-cum-acreage of the borrowing cultivators and therefore the 
larger the acreage of the borrower, the greater would be the loan 
transaction per borrower, but whether lending to the smaller cultivators 
would in effect increase the administrative costs would depend on 
whether there is any 'excess capacity' in loan administration of the 
lender. Assuming that the fixed costs of the bank (credit society) 
would not change, the administrative costs would be a function of the 
variable costs. The most significant component of the variable costs 
is salaries etc. of the loan supervisor(s). If the supervisor is not 
being fully utilised, i.e. there is 'excess capacity', then the in­
clusion of the small farmers in the clientele of the bank will not
5materially affect total administrative costs. The picture would of 
course be different, if there was no excess capacity so that increasing 
the number of loanees would entail enlisting the services of additional 
supervisors. One of the arguments for higher interest rates for rural 
lending especially to small farmers draws its inspiration from this 
factor of higher administrative costs and has been discussed in Chapter 3.
So far we have dealt with the supply aspects of institutional 
credit for small farmers. Equally important are constraints on the
5 An unpublished study conducted by Small Farmers' Development Agency, 
Cuddapah, did not find any uniform positive relationship between 
administrative costs incurred by commercial banks and small farmer 
lending. In fact the bank with the lowest administrative cost per 
unit of loan had the highest percentage of small farmer lending.
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demand side. Paradoxically, small farmers may actually demand less 
credit than they need from institutional sources for a wide variety of 
reasons. Despite attempts to streamline procedures for sanction and 
disbursement of loans, the time taken and the bureaucratic procedures 
involved in obtaining loans from institutions drives the small farmer 
to seek his requirement from moneylenders. For instance, the various 
stages from application to receipt of a short term crop-loan from a 
primary co-operative credit society are as follows:
(1) Preparation of credit limit statement (application) 
by the society on the basis of written or oral 
application by the farmer - members.
(2) Approval of the statement by the general body or 
the managing committee of the society.
(3) Transfer of the statement to the Co-op. Central 
Bank for sanction of funds beyond the resources 
of the society.
(4) Scrutiny and verification of the statement by a 
Bank inspector with reference to particulars in 
the application as well as the financial position 
of the society. The inspector passes on his 
recommendations to the Manager/Secretary of the 
Bank.
(5) The Manager submits the application for consideration 
by the Board of Directors (or a Loan Committee if it 
has been constituted). The Board sanctions the
loan provided the society is eligible (i.e. it
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has paid back the prescribed proportion of previous 
year's demand).
(6) The Co-op. Central Bank often requires its credit 
limit sanctioned by the State Co-op. Bank to be 
financially able to disburse the amount.
(7) Provided the above steps are successfully taken, 
disbursement to the farmer is effected by the 
society. The cash component is given as such 
while the kind component (usually fertilizers) is 
either distributed by the society or issued as 
cheques in favour of the marketing society dealing 
with fertilizers.
With a procedure as cumbersome as this (which incidently applies 
to all States with minor variations) delays can and do occur. It is 
true of course that the delays affect the large farmers also, but 
because the latter are not totally dependent on outside finance, the 
timing of their seasonal agricultural operations are not hindered.
Furthermore, institutional credit has very little flexibility 
in repayment and the collateral requirements and procedures for medium 
and long term loans are very tedious, time consuming and expensive in 
terms of actual financial expenditure and opportunity costs of the 
farmers time spent in obtaining the loan. For instance, just a list 
of documents to be attached to an application form (Annexure I) is 
staggering. The documents normally required in Andhra Pradesh are:
(1) Extract of Settlement Fair Adangal (Annexure II).
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(2) Extract of 10 (I) Revenue Account (Annexure III).
(3) Extract of farmer-wise cultivation account (No 2 
Account) (Annexure IV).
(4) Statement of the Property that is to be mortgaged 
to the Bank (Annexure V).
(5) Statement of Property of applicant other than the 
property offered for mortgage (Annexure VI).
(6) Sketches with boundaries if the property offered 
for mortgage is a part-field.
(7) Statement of Income and Expenditure (Annexure VII).
(8) Sale deeds if property is self acquired.
(9) Encumberance certificate for 13 years.
(10) Land Revenue receipts.
If all the expenditure time and frustrations are capitalised and the 
shadow charges for the small farmer in dealing with a bank are computed 
the balance of advantage may well lie in obtaining the loan from the 
moneylenders since although there is a considerable difference in the 
notional rates of interest, the net rates after accounting for the costs 
incurred in obtaining credit may not be substantially different.
Perhaps the most important set of reasons for limited credit 
demand for credit from institutional sources by small farmers relates 
to the inadequacy of amounts that they can obtain from those sources and 
the fact that perhaps their most vital requirement, viz. consumption 
credit is not extended by institutional sources. It has already been 
indicated elsewhere how the valuation procedure results in small farmers
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not getting the amounts of credit they require by unduly restricting 
their eligibility for term loans. Even for short term loans the 
scale of finance per acre is too low. It is ironic that the AIRCRC 
1969 found that 'the scales of finance are fixed at very high levels'
(19). While this may have been sustainable in 1969 it definitely was 
not valid in 1979. As noted by the Report of the Working Group on 
Rural Banks (1975), one of the weaknesses of the co-operative structure 
has been that 'the scale of finance actually disbursed by the co­
operatives has not been in conformity with the requirements of technology-
ß
intensive agriculture' (48). Apart from the fact that inadequate 
credit becomes infructuous as it does not lead to the expected pro­
ductivity increases, the small farmers are forced to rely on the 
moneylenders.
7Moreover, as a matter of policy, credit institutions supply 
only production credit while consumption credit is an important component 
in the loan portfolio of farmers (Table 5.4). Treating household 
expenditure synonomously with consumption credit, it may be seen (Table 
5.4) that the smallest farmers utilise the highest proportion of credit 
for consumption needs. It is paradoxical that institutions, especially 
co-operatives, which were established in the rural sector with the 
avowed objective of weaning cultivators especially small farmers away 
from moneylenders, have not catered to the most important category of 
requirement.
6 It may be noted that commercial banks, the other institutional source, 
derive their scales of finance from co-operatives.
7 In the last 3 years or so, attempts have been made to supply con­
sumption credit as well. These developments are referred to later.
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TABLE 5.4
PERCENTAGE OF BORROWING FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES BY ASSET GROUPS
(1961.62).
Asset Group Average
Borrowing
Per
Household
Capital 
Expd. 
On Farm
Current 
Expd. 
On Farm
Capital 
Expd. on 
Non-Farm
Current House- 
Expd. on hold 
Non-Farm Expd.
Repayment
of
Debt
Less than 500 45 9.3 7.8 - 1.6 71.6 5.3
500 - 1000 70 17 9.1 0.1 3.3 60.8 5.1
1000 - 2500 98 19.2 8.8 0.7 2.5 59.0 5.3
2500 - 5000 156 21.6 11.3 0.7 3.1 53.5 5.3
5000 - 10000 251 22.7 12.6 0.8 6.6 47.1 5.8
10000 - 20000 386 23.8 14.3 1.3 5.1 43.6 6.4
20000 & above 737 23.6 18.8 2.3 8.9 33.4 5.8
All Groups 205 22.1 13.5 1.2 5.6 46.6 5.7
Source: AIRDIS (58)
Thus, as a result of the inadequacy of production credit and
a direct avoidance of consumption credit by the institutions, the farmers
turn to the moneylenders. This, interestingly, may have ramifications
not widely recognized. The small farmer obtains a portion of his total
credit requirments from institutions, but since he is in debt to the
moneylender who supplies the bulk of his credit requirements at rates which
are albeit high, he may use the institutional credit fully or partly to
repay the moneylender. Such repayment increases the moneylenders' funds,
enabling him to extend his operations. So indirectly, institutional
acredit may buttress the very moneylender it was meant to replace.
Analysis of Steps to Increase Small Farmer Credit
The fact that the small farmers have not been getting their due
share of credit has been universally recognized in credit surveys. The
AIRCRC (1969) diagnosed the problem to be not so much that the larger
a This "misutilization" has been pointed out by the All India 
Rural Credit Review Committee (19).
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fanners obtained more credit than their requirements, but that a sub­
stantial portion of the small fanners did not obtain co-operative credit 
at all, and the lucky few who did, received too little of it in 
relation to their needs. The National Commission on Agriculture 
reiterated this concern when it indicated that the principle cause of 
poverty among small and marginal fanners was their low resource base 
and their inability to take advantage of modern technology (49). As 
a result of these and similar views, certain steps have been taken in 
the 1970s to increase the volume of lending to small farmers.
The first of these steps was the establishment of Small Farmers 
Development Agencies on a pilot basis country-wide in 1971-72. Registered 
as societies under the Societies Act, the Agencies were expected to act 
as catalytic agents to obtain finance from the credit institutions and 
assist the small farmer in its proper utilisation. In areas where the 
co-operative structure was weak, the Agencies provided the share capital 
contribution on behalf of the small farmers, issued loans to the District 
Co-operative Central Banks to strengthen their financial position and to 
maintain their non-overdue cover. Since one of the reasons adduced by 
credit institutions for insufficient lending to small farmers was the 
high administrative costs involved, the Agencies funded the hiring of 
additional supervisors on a tapering basis to meet the demands of small 
farmer credit. As a result of the efforts of these Agencies the lending 
institutions were encouraged to drop their insistence on the credit- 
worthiness of the borrower and adopt the more progressive guideline of 
the credit-worthiness of the proposal. The success of the programme
(over 4 million small/marginal farmers had been identified and more than
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2 million actually benefited by March 1975) (20) prompted the National
Commission on Agriculture (44) to recommend their extension, so that 
they now cover about 40% of the districts in the country.
The National Commission on Agriculture recommended the establish­
ment of Farmers Service Societies (FSS) to cater mainly to the credit 
needs of small and marginal farmers. They were to cover a development 
block or population of 10,000. Starting in 1973-74 it was expected 
that they would provide consumption as well as production credit together 
with the full package of services and technical guidance. The Commission 
had recommended the establishment of 2520 Societies over a period of 6 
years and a capacity to form 1000 new Societies per year thereafter.
While membership was not to be restricted to small farmers only, 
management would be vested in a Board on which two-thirds of members 
would be from the weaker sections, including small farmers. By the end 
of December 1976, there were 311 FSS, out of which 181 were sponsored by 
commercial banks and 130 by co-operatives. Their Statewise distribution vas 
uneven with one State (Karnataka) accounting for 37% and five States 
(Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) 
accounting for 72% of the Societies (Table 5.5).
The actual functioning of the FSS has left much to be desired 
as brought out in a recent study by the RBI. The study disclosed:
(i) that the stipulated representation to the weaker sections on the 
Board of Directors was not adhered to (ii) a large number (about 1/3) 
of the FSS did not provide any services or technical guidance to members 
(iii) their business was very meagre (iv) about 50% of them did not
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TABLE 5.5
NUMBER OF FARMERS' SERVICE SOCIETIES 
IN DIFFERENT STATES AS ON 31.12.76
States Sponsored By 
Commercial Banks
Sponsored By 
Co-op Banks
Total
1. Andhra Pradesh 15 6 21
2. Bihar 4 - 4
3. Gujarat 1 32 33
4. Haryana 5 1 6
5. Himachal Pradesh - - -
6. Jaminer & Kashmir 1 - 1
7. Karnataka 87 29 116
8. Kerala - 10 10
9. Maharashtra 15 4 19
10.Manipur 1 1 2
11.Madhya Pradesh 16 9 25
12.Rajasthan 5 - 5
13.Tamil Nadu - 11 11
14.Tripura 1 - 1
15.Uttar Pradesh 12 16 28
16.West Bengal 18 8 26
17.Orissa - 1 1
18.Others - 2 2
Total 181 130 311
Source: RBI : Report on Review Committee on Regional Rural Banks.(50)
provide medium term loans for agriculture and less than 2% issued any 
long term loans (v) more than 90% had not issued consumption loans 
(vi) more than 50% had overdues exceeding 50% of demand (vii) about 80% 
of them had not undertaken any marketing of agricultural produce of
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their members. One may therefore concur with the conclusion that 
'most of them appear to be a highly diluted version of the grand design 
of the NCA and are hardly distinguishable from the reformed PACS' (50).
Taking its cue from the Report of the Banking Commission 1972, 
the Working Group on Rural Banks 1975 recommended the organisation of a 
new institution - Regional Rural Banks (RRB) - which would combine the 
better features of both the co-operatives and commercial banks 'while 
avoiding the disabilities that are inherent to them' (48). The raison 
d'etre of the rural banks grew from the realisation that despite efforts 
by the co-operatives and commercial banks, the institutional credit 
disbursed has not benefited small and marginal farmers significantly, and 
one of the more important objectives of the rural banks was to effectively 
cover this group. Since the aim was to supplement and not supplant 
existing institutions, the Working Group suggested that initially the 
banks be set up in areas where co-operatives and commercial banks have 
not made much headway and where there is considerable scope for rural 
development. It was expected that Farmers Service Societies could be 
financed by these banks - a branch of the rural bank could be tied to 
5-10 FSS.
Starting in October 1975, 48 RRBs were established by mid 1977 
of which 20 are confined to a district, 20 have a jurisdiction of 2 
districts, 7 cover 3 districts and one has 4, giving a coverage in all 
of 85 districts out of around 350 districts in the country (Table 5.6).
By June 1977 of the total outstanding loans of Rs. 19.58 crores in the 
RRBs, 57% were to small/marginal farmers while most of the balance went
to rural artisans and others.
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TABLE 5.6
SPREAD OF REGIONAL RURAL BANKS
AMONG STATES (AS ON 30.6. 1977)
States No. of 
RRBs
No. of 
Branches 
RRBs
Percentage 
of of
Districts
Covered
Percentage
of
Population
Covered
1. Andhra Pradesh 3 86 24.0 27.9
2. Haryana 2 40 16.7 17.7
3. Karnataka 3 43 26.3 32.0
4. Kerala 2 31 30.0 29.6
5. Uttar Pradesh 10 173 23.2 29.2
6. Bihar 7 67 45.2 62.9
7. Madhya Pradesh 4 62 18.6 22.7
8. Orissa 4 72 29.4 51.6
9. Rajasthan 3 62 26.9 30.2
10.Tamil Nadu 1 8 14.3 14.7
11.Assam 1 11 42.9 45.6
12.Jammu & Kashmir 1 26 10.0 15.9
13.Tripura 1 8 33.3 100.0
14.Maharashtra 1 14 15.4 12.1
15.West Bengal 4 56 53.8 48.0
16.Himachal Pradesh 1 8 10.0 14.9
Total 48 767 26.1 32.6
Source: RBI : Report of Review Committee on RRBs. (50)
While it would be uncharitable to judge the effectiveness of 
these rural banks at such an early date, certain attempts have been made 
to assess their operations. The Review Committee on Regional Rural 
Banks (1978) evaluated the performance of 12 RRBs with reference to
indices such as spread of branches, deposit mobilisation, credit deposit
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ratio, recovery performance etc. Some interesting features thrown 
up by this evaluation were:
(1) agricultural loans formed 69% of total loans,
out of which 46% was for term loans and 23% for 
crop loans, while consumption loans accounted for 
only 1%. However, their coverage of the small/ 
marginal farmers and other weaker sections was 
inadequate (Table 5.7).
TABLE 5.7
EXTENT OF ASSISTANCE TO WEAKER SECTIONS IN 12 RRBs
Name of RRB
Percentage of 
to the total
this type of borrowers financed 
estimated number in that category
Small/Marginal
Farmers
Agricultural
Labourers
Rural
Artisans
1. Bellary 7.3 - 5.2
2. Bhojpur-Rohtas 6.3 0.0 3.4
3. Hoshangabad 4.3 0.1 9.6
4. Jaipur 12.0 6.4 30.3
5. Koraput 0.8 1.6 2.2
6. Moradabad 0.9 1.2 1.1
7. Champaran 4.3 0.1 8.6
8. Bhiwani 1.4 7.8 0.1
9. Gorakhpur-Deoria 2.7 0.6 0.6
lO.Cannanore 0.7 0.4 0.1
11.Khammam-Nalgonda 4.1 0.2 0.8
12.Mallabhum 0.1 0.0 0.0
Source: RBI : Report of the Review Committee on RRBs. (50)
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(2) Their credit deposit ratio was 130% compared to 
64% of the commercial banks in the same area.
(3) The overdues to demand ratio was 16%.
(4) The interest rates charged by commercial banks 
for advances were generally lower than those 
charged by RRBs. This is an anomalous situation 
as it implies that credit to small farmers was 
supplied at a higher rate than that supplied by 
commercial banks which cater mostly for larger 
farmers.
(5) Central Govt, nominees were frequently absent
from meetings of the Board of Directors of the Bank.
Based on these indicators of performance, the Review Committee concluded 
that 'with some modifications in their organisation and functions (RRBs) 
can become a very useful component in the totality of rural credit 
structure 1. In fact the committee went on to recommend the phasing 
out of rural branches of commercial banks (of which there were 8756) in 
favour of RRBs. RRBs are considered better suited because of their 
comparative simplicity, lower costs of operation, local involvement 
through appropriate staffing pattern etc.
However, while one may not like to dampen the enthusiasm and 
confidence shown by the Committee in the RRBs, indications are that this 
institutional initiative is likely to strike problems as others before 
it with consumption credit. Despite the importance of consumption 
credit in the overall credit requirement especially for small farmers,
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the original Working Group had adopted a very ambivalent attitude 
towards it. Without strong direction the result was that only 0.5-1% 
of the loans have been made for consumption purposes. This is a very 
serious shortcoming especially in view of legislations enacted by 
various States aimed at eradication of rural indebtedness to the exploit­
ative moneylenders. Thus if and when the supply of such credit from 
informal sources dries up, there is likely to be a greater degree of 
surreptitious diversion of credit from production to consumption which 
may well in course of time endanger the functioning of the RRBs. It 
is contended here that the basic lesson of rural credit, i.e. the 
necessity to link production and consumption credit does not appear to 
have been learned.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
In this study an attempt has been made to analyse the importance 
of agricultural credit in the process of development in India. It is 
conceded that credit is not a panacea, that to promote development it is 
necessary to pursue a wide range of measures and that credit is only one 
of the many factors involved. For instance, a credit financed expansion 
in the demand for inputs, not matched by a corresponding increase in 
input supplies, will only result in a price rise, with little impact on 
production and may even adversely affect distribution. However, it is 
equally true that in the calculus of policy determination, to minimise 
the role of credit for reasons of exigency and analytical neatness is to 
underplay its significance. The increasing levels of rural unemployment 
and poverty are grim testimony of the misdirection of past agricultural 
credit policies. Unfortunately, however, except for a few surveys by 
the Reserve Bank of India, very little comprehensive work has been done 
in the field of agricultural credit in India. This has had the effect 
of imposing a severe limitation of data upon this study.
The relative neglect of credit in overall developmental strategies 
can perhaps be attributed to the conceptual and computational difficulties 
in determining the demand for credit. This demand is composite and 
derived, being the sum of the demands for consumption and production
(investment). At best, using for instance, a production function approach,
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the marginal productivity of production credit can be calculated and it 
can be hypothesised that if the marginal productivity is greater than 
the cost, then the level of credit used is below optimum and vice versa 
(86). However, because of the fungibility of consumption and production 
credit, it is difficult to estimate the overall marginal productivity of 
credit.
This interchangeability is illustrated by the fact that provision 
of production credit releases farmers' own funds for consumption and 
tends to reduce the demand for consumption credit. Again, traditional 
agriculture is characterized by a high proportion of inputs obtained from 
the farm, so the requirement of credit is essentially to meet the 
consumption needs of farmers. Modernisation is accompanied by the 
addition of purchased inputs which implies a shift towards a greater 
requirement of production finance. This linkage between production 
and consumption credit implies that to estimate whether credit use is 
optimal, it is essential to be able to estimate the marginal productivity 
of consumption credit. But what is the marginal productivity of 
consumption credit required to ensure ones continued physical existence 
or satisfying compelling social obligations? Because of this problem 
of measurement, no attempt has been made in this study to evaluate the 
composite demand for credit except to argue that this composite require­
ment is not likely to alter appreciably in the absence of introduction 
of new technology.
Analysis of credit supply reveals a credit gap in the rural 
sector which is both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitatively, 
agriculture does not get adequate finance and qualitatively, whatever
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it does get is obtained at a high price, with the small farmers being 
the most disadvantaged. Although the share of institutional credit 
in the total credit supply has increased over the years, it is still 
only around one-third of total credit disbursed by all sources. 
Cooperatives are the major institutional source; commercial banks whose 
foray into the field of agricultural credit is recent, have been found 
to be more active precisely in those areas where cooperatives are 
functioning more efficiently. The flow of Government credit too has 
followed a similar pattern and indicates a widening of inter-regional 
disparities in credit distribution. Despite the importance of credit 
for small farmers, they are constrained and have to depend on higher 
cost moneylenders for their requirement. One of the reasons for this 
is that credit institutions provide only production credit whereas, 
traditionally at least the major requirement was for consumption credit.
The reasons for this low volume of credit to the agricultural 
sector in general, and within this sector, to small farmers in particular, 
have been investigated. Our analysis shows that the inadequacy of 
institutional agricultural credit cannot be explained by low interest 
rates as the rates were found to be higher in agriculture than in 
industry and commerce.
It has been postulated here that the rate of interest is a 
function of lender's opportunity and administrative costs, risk premium, 
inflationary premium, and monopoly profit. An attempt has been made 
to examine the contribution of these variables in the determination of 
interest rates. The contribution of opportunity costs and administrative 
costs could not be measured owing to lack of data. Using proxies for
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other variables, calculation of Spearman's co-efficient of rank 
correlation (r') between each variable and the rate of interest, resulted 
in significant values of r'. Since the values of r' for monopoly 
power and inflationary premium were more than twice that of risk, it 
can be concluded that within the limitations of data, monopoly power 
(and inflation) rather than risk, are more important in the determination 
of interest rates. This is indicative of the under-development and 
fragmentation of rural financial markets.
The arguments for higher rates of interest for small farmer 
credit have been examined and it has been argued here that they are not 
tenable in the Indian context. Only under certain conditions, there is 
some justification for higher rates on grounds of higher administrative 
costs. On the other hand, on equity and economic grounds, there is a 
strong justification for differential rates of interest in favour of 
small farmers.
Finally, an attempt has been made to ascertain and analyse 
conditions which are conducive for the better operation of institutional 
credit agencies. Analysis of inter-State data shows that better 
institutional credit arrangements and higher level of literacy, 
satisfactory performance in implementation of land reforms, use of 
irrigation particularly well irrigation, use of chemical fertilizers, 
progress in rural electrification and development of marketing are 
positively and significantly associated. Although data are inadequate 
to establish any causal relationship, they do tend to reinforce the view 
that a mere expansion of credit without an improvement in input supplies, 
rural organisation, marketing etc. is not likely to yield results.
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6.2 Policy Implications
Since inadequacy of institutional credit for agriculture cannot 
be explained by lower interest rates, to suggest policies for increasing 
the volume of credit to the agricultural sector, it is pertinent to 
examine why the credit flow to the rural areas is inadequate. One
possible answer lies in issues connected with the management of rural 
credit institutions.
The co-operatives in India were not established by the people 
to serve their felt needs. They were imposed from above. One of the 
objectives was to develop leadership at the grass roots level, and hence 
the management functions of primary societies were vested in their 
Presidents, who are generally local politicians from the rural elite. 
Their interest in the performance of these societies is marginal and 
incidental to their main political ambitions and often the two do not 
coincide. Frequently, the Presidents use their office to give access 
to or deny credit purely on grounds of political expediency. At the 
district and State levels, although day to day management is notionally 
vested in a full time Manager/Secretary, the elected Chairmen supposedly 
being concerned only with policy, in actual practice there is seldom a 
clear demarcation in functions. Moreover, the Managers are largely on 
short term deputation from the Co-operative Department, a factor which, 
apart from making for discontinuity in management, also impedes the 
creation of a trained management pool.
The policy prescription that emerges from the above analysis is
clearly to divorce co-operative credit from politics instead of expending
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effort, as in the past, on seemingly endless debates regarding the 
optimum size or number of activities of co-operatives. It is realised 
of course, that implementation of this would be difficult given the 
existing political framework. But drastic remedies are required 
otherwise the crippling effects of the alarmingly high overdues (nearing 
50% of outstandings) are likely to paralyse these institutions.
Commercial banks (the other major institutional source) have 
been more concerned with branch expansion policy under the implicit 
expectation that this will lead to a substantially higher volume of 
lending. That this expectation has not been fulfilled, is, in the 
opinion of the author, attributable largely to the style and quality of 
management. The rural bank branches have tended to be exact replicas 
of their urban counterparts; from buildings and staffing patterns to 
organisational procedures. This superimposition is inappropriate as 
the environment and basic objectives of banks in the two sectors are 
not identical. The low levels of literacy in rural areas, the mental 
reservations of farmers vis-a-vis use of banks, and the unique 
characteristics of agricultural production, call for a different approach 
which the existing 'decolam counter culture' (48) is ill-equipped to 
provide.
This is compounded by the staffing pattern and their attitudes. 
The staff are generally recruited from urban areas and have urban back­
grounds which acts as a constraint on meaningful interaction with 
illiterate farmers. On the one hand, farmers feel ill at ease discussing 
their requirements with the staff, and on the other hand since the staff 
are themselves not locally recruited, they find it difficult to identify
Ill
and empathize with prospective client farmers. The basic attitudes 
of the bank staff are not helpbul in this. Transfer to a rural branch 
is viewed with trepidation, as a punishment or at best, as a necessary 
evil. Staff are therefore not keen to take any initiatives, but try 
to maintain the status quo. In fulfilling their responsibilities, they 
remain impatient to revert to the urban areas. With this attitude, it 
is hardly surprising that commercial banks have been net exporters of 
capital from the rural to the urban areas and that a large proportion of 
their lending has been for term loans, e.g. tractor loans.
The policy implication here is that there should be adminis­
trative separation of rural from urban bank branches. Since the 
background, skills, knowledge and temperament of personnel required for 
efficient operation in rural areas is different, recruitment and training 
of staff should be designed to meet these requirements.
It is, however, doubtful if a mere revamping of management of 
the existing credit institutions will result in appreciably more credit 
going to small farmers. Despite a number of experiments and the 
establishment of agencies such as the Farmers' Service Societies, and 
Regional Rural Banks to cater to their needs, their position to date has 
not improved. Farmers' Service Societies were expected to look after 
the credit needs of small farmers by providing them with credit, technical 
services and marketing arrangements, but have been unsuccessful. The 
coverage of small farmers by Regional Rural Banks is inadequate and 
consumption loans form only 1% of total loans issued by them.
Small farmers have not only been denied adequate credit but
112
have also been handicapped in obtaining services such as extension, 
marketing etc. One method of adequately catering for their needs is 
to set up a separate credit channel exclusively for them. The 
intention of this proposal is not to add one more to the plethora of 
existing credit institutions. The objective could be achieved by 
restructuring Regional Rural Banks in such a way as to make them 
effective.
At present these banks are sponsored by co-operatives and 
commercial banks which exert a major influence on their operations, and 
there is a great danger that the disabilities of the co-operatives 
and commercial banks will permeate Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) unless 
the organisational association between them is severed. Therefore, it 
is suggested that the restructured RRBs be organised as autonomous 
corporations, one for each State with branches at the district and lower 
field levels.
This would impart a greater flexibility to their operations. 
Personnel could be recruited locally so that they would be familiar with 
local conditions. This would not only help to reduce educated rural 
unemployment but would also help in keeping administrative costs down 
since they need not be paid the high salaries that are available to staff 
in commercial banks.
To be effective a small farmer credit programme needs to learn 
from the operation and experience of the moneylenders. The popularity 
of informal sources is due to their accessibility, flexibility, adapt­
ability, simplicity and the fact that they provide consumption as well
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as production credit. These services are possible because of the 
moneylenders' intricate knowledge of local production possibilities, 
of the character of individual borrowers and of the value of assets 
offered as security. With the modifications suggested, the RRBs would 
be able to use similar methods of operation to those followed by 
informal credit sources.
It is envisaged that these reorganised RRBs would function in 
close association with Small Farmer Development Agencies (SFDA) so that 
small farmers would obtain supervised credit"*" which would include credit, 
technical and financial management advice and marketing facilities.
These proposals may draw criticism on the ground that they would increase 
the costs of lending. This need not be so, however, as (i) Farmers 
Service Societies would become redundant and their closure would reduce 
overall costs of credit disbursement; (ii) RRBs are already in existence; 
(iii) SFDAs have been in operation for some years and cover about 40% 
of the districts in the country; (iv) any increase in administrative 
costs, would be counter-balanced by a reduction in default rates to be 
expected with the closely supervised credit arrangement. Furthermore, 
in view of the special position that small farmers occupy in the economy, 
even if there were a slight increase in costs this could be traded off 
against the benefits that would follow from an effective extension of 
credit to small farmers. Viewed in the context of laws to curb the
1 At present supervision of credit in India has meant the incorporation 
of a kind component (usually fertilizers) in the distribution of crop 
loans. This is apparently based on the premise that farmers will 
misutilise loans if given in cash. Even if the validity of this 
assumption is not questioned, it ignores the fact that fertilizers 
are a very marketable commodity, and there is nothing to prevent 
farmers from obtaining cash by sale of fertilizers. Such 'supervision' 
is misconceived and only serves to increase the cost of credit.
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activities of moneylenders, there is an urgent need to fill up the 
vacuum in the supply of credit to small farmers. Reliance on pro­
grammes that involve only marginal change to the present unsatisfactory 
arrangements is likely to perpetuate the existing misallocation of 
resources.
ANNEXURE 1
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THE _________________CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD.
No.
Date of receipt: L.A.No.
referred to Supervisor
Total amount of fees
collected: Date:
Secretary's initials:
APPLICATION FOR LOAN
Date:
To
The Secretary,
The __________________Co-operative Agricultural Development
Bank Limited,
The loan application of Sri/Smt.
a resident of ______________ village in the taluk of ___
agriculturist and a member of your bank with General No.
I request that a loan of Rs. _______ may be sanctioned to me for
the development of my land on the mortgage of lands mentioned in this 
application and the produce raised on it annually. I have read the 
conditions stipulated in the annexed loan application and the by-laws 
of your Bank and other regulation stipulated therein. I shall abide 
by them and also agree to abide by any modifications that are made in the 
future. I am taking this loan for the benefit of my family as manager 
of the members of the joint family on my behalf and on behalf of my 
brothers, sons, daughters etc. of the joint family. I furnish herewith 
the full particulars relating to the loan application. I am remitted 
Rs. towards the administrative and other fees.
SIGNATURE OF THE APPLICANT
ANNEXURE 1 (contd)
STATEMENT OF THE MEMBER
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To
The Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd.
I, ______ ______________________________________ , member No.______
of your Bank, resident of ______________________village, _____________ taluk,
solemnly affirm and state that:
(1) I stated that the total amount of loans I previously owed as
Rs.__________. The loans mentioned are due to the persons shown against
them only. No other loans are due by me to any other person. It is
solemnly affirmed that I do not have any other loans except those mentioned 
in the application and in case it is found, otherwise, I shall abide by the 
civil and criminal actions taken by your bank besides agreeing not to 
object the action of the bank for foreclosing the loan to be given to me 
by the bank and to recover the amounts of loss incurred by the bank on 
account of me by bringing the properties offered by me as mortgage to the 
bank and other movable and immovable properties belonging to me to sale.
I also hereby affirm that I will not borrow loans till the final discharge 
of the loan applied for from your bank.
(2) I have taken this loan, solemnly affirming that except mortgaging
the properties to the bank previously under document No. ___________  dated
____________ , I have not mortgaged nor alienated these properties to any
others nor there are any auctions or executions by any civil court or 
Revenue Department. If at a later date, any other alienations or any other 
liabilities are noticed, excepting those mentioned in the application, I 
shall abide by the civil or criminal action to be taken by your bank.
(3) I shall not offer the properties offered by me to the Bank or the 
produce raised annually on it to any other person as security till the 
loan taken by me from your Bank is completely discharged.
(4) I do not owe any amount to the Government towards kist or cess on 
any of the land owned by me as on date. I am enclosing the relevant 
receipts herewith. In future also, I shall remit the kist amount and 
cess on all the lands owned by me in time and shall produce the receipts 
every year by first May, in case the bank desires so. In case of failure,
I agree to the action to be taken by the bank for collecting the entire 
loan without reference to the instalment on this plea alone.
(5) I have furnished the details of the development I am going to
do at page No. ____. I request you to grant me a loan of Rs.______  after
verifying them. I shall repay such loan amount in ____ years in equated
annual instalments together with interest at the rate fixed by you.
(6) The persons of the joint family interested in the property shall 
join as ' B' Class members and execute the mortgage bond along with me.
Yours faithfully,
Village:
Date: SIGNATURE OF THE APPLICANT.
The applicant swore before me that the above mentioned particulars are 
true and signed the statement.
SIGNATURE OF THE VILLAGE OFFICER
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EXTRACT OF 10 (1) ACCOUNT FOR _________ FASLI (CULTIVATION YEAR)
RELATING TO __________________ VILLAGE OF ________________ TALUK
IN DISTRICT SETTLEMENT REGISTER
Name of the Person:
Particulars 
of years
1
Survey No. Total
and Sub- DRY______  WET kist
division
No. of the Extent kist Extent kist
field
2 3 4 5 6 7
N.B.
8
EX
TR
AC
T 
OF
 N
O.
 
2 
AC
CO
UN
T 
(A
GR
IC
UL
TU
RI
ST
-W
IS
E 
CU
LT
IV
AT
IO
N 
AC
CO
UN
T)
 
OF
 T
HE
 _
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
 V
IL
LA
GE
 O
F
TA
LU
K 
IN
 
DI
ST
RI
CT
 F
OR
 T
HE
 C
UL
TI
VA
TI
ON
 Y
EA
R 
__
__
__
__
__
Xft3eCD&
I Cn CD ft Ö  U CD "H -H ft W  'H 3 -rj 
C/3 >  O
CO
Xftfd
£CDDh
CD ft Cn CD fd U 
I— I * H  rft ft •H ft >  O
CD X! ft
4-1 O
CDft ft fd Oe ft•H U  -PCO 4-1 
W  0
X4-> I -PÖ  ft COO  ft (d (D HS o S3 >
43rH
LD i— I
ft H  X  P H  U
CD X! CD +J
I 4-1
Z  O
4-1o
Xftaoa
aoftu
co•Hftcd
>
n
r—I
CM I— I
rH I— I
o
rH
**
*
43CD -P fd 
> ■H P  I— I
ft)Ü
CO•H
COCD X  X C ft -H
O  Ö •H Pft P  fd a ft a) s>1 CD rHqo
ft CD 
O  X
CO
CD P
- OCO -n
ftH
fd CD ft coo
p X ft) s 0 
X P ft CD •H 43
S q
CDftfd
to
43
COc •0  CD CO ft ft fd CDft CO
cd q
ft X fd H  P  H
fto
COrH•HidpCD
43
CD
XP
COCOCDrH
fdpp
idft
ftoft
pcCD
PX(D
a)
X
p
ftoft
cd q u  fdft H
pO  CO co fd
Co•H
P<dtp•Hftft•H
43 Ö fd I—I
fto
CO I— I •H fd p  
CDa
o
xCO
>1 I— ICO 
p 0 •H >CD ft ft ft ftCO -H 
43
§ SH  O 
X CD P  
X
P S
COCDÜft
P0CO
ÖO•HP
fdtp•H
119
ST
A
TE
M
EN
T 
O
F 
TH
E 
PR
O
PE
R
TY
 
TH
A
T 
IS
 
TO
 
BE
 
M
O
RT
G
A
G
ED
 
TO
 
TH
E 
BA
N
K
I
S N H V w a  H II
s o q o j  q u e s o j d  p u p  i 
p -[0 oq ß u x p jo o o o  Joqum N j 
Ao a jr s  q o o o  j o  onquA  o q o u rrx o jd d Y  !
SpUPX Oqq UO 9 UIOOUI I
I
I
x n o
p 0 SP0 p JO uoxq.PATq.xno umo jo q q o q M
IPS
P
03
S
wp
PS
wC4
03
<
q .upoxxddp  I 
oqq  oq ß u x q p x o J  q u o q x g  i
*ON Ä0 AXUS I 
oqq ux pupx s,q .upoxxddp i 
oqq S0TX opxs qoxq/A uo i
I
I-------------------------------------------------------------1
I
■on ÄOAxns oqq jo q.uoqxo xuqoj, 1
II-------------------------------------------------------------1
I 
I
joqum N  ä o a ju s
q.uPOTxddp j
oqq. q o  p u p x  oqq  oq  s o x jo p u n o g  i
•on  Ao a jr s  oqq  ux so x p  p u u j  
s .q u p o x p d d p  oqq  'o p x s  qoxqw  uo
----------------------------------------------------1
I
•o n 'S  oqq j o  quoqxo xeqoj. j
I----------------------------------------------------1
I
p p o jj  sqq jo  ouiPN j
I
----------------------------------------------------1
00
I—I
rH
VD
r—I
in
rH
rH
m
rH
CM
rH
rH
rH
q u p o x p d d p  oq  ß u x q p x o x  q u o q x g  i r"
• on Ao a jr s  1 ^
qo/A xo  ä j q  ! <n
q s u d  o q q  ux  [ 
sp u p p  u ipu i j o  x jp p u x u rp z  jo q q o q M  j
oßppXTA 9q q  J °  ouiPN [ H
•H CD
C/3 tn
03 xd
CD S CD
03 i—i
03 f t S
0 0 0
a G
ft f t
03 03
•H CD >i
f t f t 6
G CD 4h
•H f t 0
f t
CD f t
P 0 03
cd f t CD
ftft 03
G xd CD
d G ft
Ü cd ft
•H rH
i—1 0
ft CD ft
f t 03
cd CD ft
f t G
CD ft CD
f t e
f t G -P
0 p
f t cd
0 03 f t
G CD
>1 cd Q
ft 0
p i—1 CD
CD q
f t •H G
0 > CD
P 0 >
f t u C3
o PS
xd cd
CD EH P
c 0
0 0
•H G ft
f t p
g (D q
CD P 0
e cd u
(D CD rH
> P •H
0 CD >
A f t •H
<3 f t u
CD xd >i
f t G G
ft cd cd
ft f t >1
cd G f t
f t CD
ft P 03
2 G
xd p 0
g CD "H
> •p
Q q
O ü
-p <D
u CD X
CD f t CD
P ft
P P
0 0 0o f t
03
CD (D G
P q 0
<d xd •H
ft
CD • CD U
> 03 q q
0  P G cd
f t  cd CD
cd CD > 44
>c CD 0
xd P
cd m 03
ft H xd G
03 G 0
•H ft cd •H
G 03 rH ft
P cd o
q h 4-1 cd
4-1 0
CD 0
03 ft 03 G
P ft P
cd cd CD
-H P CD P
q 0 p cdo ft p
•H cd CD
1 ft ft p
1 p  c 0 CD
1 Cd CD G ft
1 cq i • ft
1 >1 CD CD1 CD o P Cn ft
1 ft -n cd xd cd
1 ft g CD ft
1 Q CD CD rH ft
1 W ft p £
1 H cd xd <D 0 xd
1 Em ft g ft G G
1 H Eh cd Pc M s
1 Eh
1 PS
1 W X---Ni r ) i—1 rsi ro
120
SI
G
N
A
TU
R
E 
O
F 
TH
E 
V
IL
LA
G
E 
O
FF
IC
E
R
 
SI
G
N
A
TU
R
E 
O
F 
TH
E 
A
PP
L
IC
A
N
T
Na
me
 o
f 
th
e 
vi
ll
ag
e 
Dr
y 
or
 w
et
 
Su
rv
ey
 N
o.
 
Ex
te
nt
 
Se
lf
 c
ul
ti
va
te
d 
In
co
me
or
 l
ea
se
d
1 dJ 1 1
1 ■P P 1 1 <31 P fd 1 i 0
1 QJ 1 1 0
1 Oh 03 1 i f t
1 0  Q) 1 i
l P QJ 43 f t  1 1 44
1 Oh f t  0 H  1 1 O
1 •P -H U  1 1 00
l 03 d H  I 1 QJ
1 Q) P  P f t  1 1 O
1 d  0  d f t  1 i d
l 0  f t O  1 i fd
i •H -P 1 i i—i
1 •P d  CO f t  1 i fd
1 £3 QJ P U  1 1 CQ
1 QJ S fd <  1 i
1 B > i H f t  1 i
1 0  d f t  1 i
1 QJ - n  O H  1 i
1 >  £3 -H >  1 i
1 0  QJ 4-1 l 03
• 1 f t  n f t  1 1 44 0) CO
PQ l fd o3 fd O  1 1 f t  P QJ 03
r -  i £3 f t 1 1 QJ 43 d
2 l QJ fd f t  1 1 CO 44 44 fd
l 43 QJ f t  1 1 f t  44 i—1
l 44 £3 43 f t  1 1 0 0
l 0  44 f t  1 44 P
l 44 -H <  1 l 03 co QJ
i fd CO 03 2  1 1 QJ 03 QJ 43
l f t  0  d f t  1 1 Cn d f t  44 r -
l 4-> QJ fd H  1 I td fd fd 0
l CO W 1 i f t  f t f t
i 03 CO 4-1 1 1 44 44 p
l CD 0  d • 1 1 P QJ P 0
l •h  f t  fd 4-1 1 1 0  43 0
l 44 O O 1 1 B 44 B 32
l •H d  'H QJ 1 1 d
l 4-1 *H i—1 P 1 i 4h d co cd
l P f t P 1 1 H  0 fd 43
l QJ CO f t 0 1 1
i U  -H fd Ü 1 1
<H P 
0
0) f t  
tn -P 
0  O 
tx>
4-> 0 
P 03
§ %
03
0
d
O•H
4->
d
0
B
0
>
0
■a
ft £
0)
43
-P
0
-P
0
tn
0
cm
-P
p
0)
B
> i
43
4*
d
fd
43
0
43 
-P
B
O
p
44
03
0
•H
I-1
O -H
B £
0 0 
43 43 
f t  4J
P CO 
O d
44 0  O
03 -H 
0
P 0  
QJ >  
44 O 
f t  f to fd
Ci ’H 
Oh
fd P 
QJ
d 43 
fd -P 
0  O rH
Q) g
-P 43 
-P 
O -H 
■P S
VO
ID
ro
CM
i 1 QJ 1 1
Eh i 1 CO QJ 1 1
2 i 1 0  43 1 1
< i 1 £1 44 d 1 1
U i 1 P fd VO 1 1
H i 1 d  44 0 1 1ft i 1 f t  0 f t 1 1
f t
a
i
ii
1
1I
1
1I
1
1I
W
i
i
1
1
1 44
1
1
1
1
1
1 QJa i w 1 d  d 1 1 ft
Eh i Q i d  QJ 1 1 44
i Z 1 0  42 LT) | 1ft i Jx I B  fd 1 1 CO 44
O i f t 1 3  44 1 1 d  0
i 1 1 1 fd
w i f t 1 1 1 o  co
f t i - 1 1 1 f t  CO
f t i Eh 1 1 1 QJ
Eh i 2 1 QJ 1 1 <u d
< i «3 1 44 1 1 f t  44
2 i U i fd f t  1 1 44 O
e> i f t 1 Q 1 1 0
H i f t 1 1 l 44 P
w i ft 1 1 1 0  P
i f t 1 QJ 1 1 0
i 5 1 f t  QJ 1 1 CO u W
i 1 fd 44 1 1 p ft
i 1 f t  0 1 1 fd 0 D
i 1 44 2 1 1 f t  f t f t
i 1 P 1 1 d  44 <
i 1 0  >1 1 1 Ü 2
i i e  p 1 1 •H o CJ
i 1 0 1 1 P  44 H
i 1 44 CO ro  | 1 P UJ
i 1 0  co 1 1 f t 0  44
i 1 -H 1 1 w Oh »-I
i 1 CO g 1 1 (J 0
i 1 f t  o 1 1 H 0  w
i 1 f t  p 1 1 f t f t
i 1 fd f t • 1 1 f t 44 B
i 1 44 u 1 1 o
i 1 OJ P 44 1 1 0  03
i 1 Q  0 QJ 1 1 > 1 44 0
i 1 1 1 f t d  -H
i 1 1 1 f t •H 44
i 1 1 1 D 0
i 1 1 1 CX 03 -H
i 1 1 1 2 0  44
i 1 1 1 f t P 0
i 1 1 1 ■H 0
i 1 1 1 f t d
i 1 1 1 f t U* 03
i 1 1 44 1 f t d  d
i 1 1 QJ 1 0  0
i 1 1 f t 1 f t
i 1 1 Ü 1 O > i 44
i 1 1 0 1 h  d
i 1 1 W 1 f t rH 0
i 1 1 1 f t 0  Ü
i 1 1 QJ 1 < d  -H
i 1 1 > 1 o 0  H
i 1 1 f t 44 1 H 0  Oh
i i d 1 44 d 1 f t P Oh
i 1 o 1 fd QJ 1 H 0  0
i 1 CO 1 P g 1 f t Oh
i i p  d 1 QJ 2 1 f t 0
i i QJ d 1 f t p 1 f t 0  f t
i 1 f t  0 1 0 QJ 1 u >  44
i i f t 1 1 > 1 0
i 1 QJ 1 0 0 1 f t  > i
i 1 43 QJ 1 o u 1 f t
i 1 44 43 CM 1 to 1 H
i 1 44 1 B B d 1 0
i 1 44 1 0 0 fd 1 44 >
i 1 0  03 1 P P 0 1 0  0
i 1 QJ 1 44 44 f t 1 f t  f t
i 1 QJ d 1 1 44 (d
i 1 B co 1 CO CO p 1
i 1 fd CO 1 d d QJ 1 03 03
i 1 2  f t 1 fd td f t 1 0  0
i 1 1 0 0 44 1 •H f t
i 1 1 id f t O 1 44 0
i 1 1 •H -H •
i 1 0 1 1 44 £  0
i 1 2 f t  1 v 1 P P B
i 1 td 43 U 1 0  d  id
I i m 1 -—- s— I n  4h 0
121
SI
GN
AT
UR
E 
OF
 T
HE
 A
PP
LI
CA
NT
ANNEXURE VII
122
STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
Rs.
ANNUAL INCOME
(1) On lands offered for mortgage.
(2) On other lands.
(3) On other properties.
(4) On profession, business etc. ___
TOTAL:
ANNUAL EXPENDITURE
1. Agricultural expenses
(a) On lands offered for mortgage.
(b) On other lands.
2. Taxes
(a) On lands offered for mortgage.
(b) On other lands.
(c) Other taxes.
3. Family expenses
4 Other expenses ___
TOTAL:
NET INCOME
SIGNATURE OF THE APPLICANT
ANNEXURE VII(cont<
123
DETAILS OF DEVELOPMENT PROPOSED ON THE LANDS BY THE APPLICANT
( The details of the various developments proposed by the applicant 
and the expenditure to be incurred should be mentioned in detail. 
The details of lands, their Survey Numbers and their extent on 
which the developments are proposed should be mentioned. The 
additional income that could be derived should also be mentioned 
with details.)
SIGNATURE OF THE APPLICANT
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